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I. Introduction
In 1978, the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission pub-
lished a thorough and lengthy report,I the product of approximately
1. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, ARsONS: A REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY (May 1978) [hereinafter cited as ARSONS].
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a year and one half's study of the arson problem in that state.'
Comparing state and nationwide statistics for arson prosecutions,
the authors noted that "[s]tatistically, arson is the safest crime to
commit."3 This critique of the arson problem underscores the inher-
ent contradictions which face any analysis of the extent and nature
of arson. It is a particularly apt comment on that type of arson
which is motivated by an intent to defraud an insurance company:
while there is a nationwide conviction rate for all arson offenses of
less than one percent,' even fewer fraud arson schemes result in
conviction.5 As one reporter noted, "Arson-for-profit is a curious
hybrid-it is the only organized white collar crime kicked off by a
violent offense."' The difficulties of identifying and proving the
crime of arson are paralleled in the civil area by difficulties which
insurance companies face in establishing arson as defense to a
claims payment.
Courts have recognized for years the problems in successfully
bringing a case of arson fraud.7 The surreptitious nature of the crime
results in the commission of an offense for which few witnesses.are
ever present. The intended victim, the insurance company, is con-
siderably removed in time and often by jurisdiction from the fraud-
ulent act; the possibility that a crime was committed may not even
come to the attention of a carrier until well after the fire has de-
stroyed the property and a claim has been filed. The unintended
victims-the casualties of the actual burning-abound, but they
may have even less to add in establishing arson. Commenting on a
recent wave of suspicious fires, a Miami arson investigator pointed
out: "[flt's very difficult to get a conviction because you've got to
prove a crime was committed and then tie the person to the crime.
In addition, so much evidence is destroyed by a fire that it's difficult
to prove arson 100%."I It has become a truism that criminal arson
2. Id. at 1. The report was prepared in response to Senate Resolution 474, adopted by the
Illinois Senate on December 16, 1976.
3. Id. at 32.
4. See, e.g., Arson: The Most Neglected Crime on Earth, THE PoLIcE CHIEF, July 1974,
at 33.
5. Id.
6. Karchmer, "Arson," N.Y. Times, August 7, 1978, at Cl, col. 3, reprinted in 124 CoNG.
REc. S12890 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1978).
7. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 173 S.C. 161, 175 N.E. 277 (1934). As the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1970),
"[Blecause of the nature of the crime, direct evidence is seldom available .... [Clonse-
quently circumstantial evidence, plus reasonable inferences must be relied on to establish the
identity and wilfullness of the guilty person." Id.
8. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, at A5, col. 1 (emphasis added).
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cases are successfully based on primarily circumstantial evidence.
This is no less true for establishing defenses to an insurance claim.
Arson statistics are by no means coordinated. Until 1979, for ex-
ample, there were no comprehensive nationwide criminal arson sta-
tistics available. Arson was classified as a Part II offense for pur-
poses of the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports,' with the result that only
the national arrest rates and arrest trends were interpreted. There-
fore, the data generated by the F.B.I. simply indicated that approxi-
mately 8.7 arrests per 100,000 were for arson. 0 A recent amend-
ment to S. 1437"I entitled the "Arson Control Assistance Act," pro-
posed by Senator John Glenn of Ohio and adopted as S. 18822 in
April, 1978 included the offense as a Part I crime. 3 This classifica-
tion is only effective, however, for one year,"' although subsequent
permanent upgrading is expected." At the very least, this should
increase the data base for the criminology of arson.
In 1977, the U.S. Fire Administration released data indicating a
total of 177,000 arson "incidents" for that year." The statistics for
dollar, property and human loss are more startling. It has been
estimated that 1,000 persons die annually as a result of arson, 7 with
an additional 10,000 reported injuries." The 1976 dollar loss to arson
was approximately $1.5 billion" and a $1.6 billion loss was reported
for 1977.0 Moreover, the financial loss per arson incident is signifi-
9. See, e.g., F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 304 (1978) [hereinafter cited as F.B.I.
REPORTS). Arson is classified as a Part II offense, indicating that only arrests are reported.
The Report notes the purpose for collecting such statistics for these offenses: "[Tihe number
of arrests are primarily a measure of police activity." Id. at 169.
10. Id. at 173. For a breakdown according to age, see id. at 174. For urban arrest trends,
see id. at 187. For suburban arrest trends, see id. at 196. For rural arrest trends, see id. at
205.
11. S. 1882, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 124 CONG. REc. S12889 (daily ed.
Aug. 8, 1978).
12. Id.
13. Part I crimes include such crimes as homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. F.B.I. REPORTS, supra note 9.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. See, e.g., H.R. 2265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2211, 96th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1979); H.R. 2763, 96th Cong., (1st Sess., 1979); H.R. 2245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
16. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, ROLE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN DEALNG WrI ARoN-FoR-PRoIr 14 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as ARSON INVESTIGATIONS].
17. 124 CONG. REC. 87178 (daily ed. May 9, 1978).
18. Id.
19. ARSONS, supra note 1, at 99.
20. ARSON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 16, at 1. But see 124 CONG. REc. 87178 (Senator
Glenn reported $3 billion in insurance company losses).
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cantly higher than that loss sustained by other property crimes: for
example, the average dollar loss from an arson is $6,433 compared
with an average robbery loss of $338.1 There are problems with
these statistics as well, primarily since both data sources, the U. S.
Fire Administration and the American Insurance Association, do
not (or are not able to) distinguish fires classified .as arson from
those categorized as simply suspicious."
Organized crime is decidely involved in arson, in two respects:
arson-for-profit = and arson for enforcement."4 Arson "rings" have
been documented in such cities as Peoria, 3 Tampa," and Boston.27
As a racket, organized arson generally involves an overall scheme to
defraud insurance companies, including as co-conspirators real es-
tate brokers,2 contractors, 2 and insurance adjustors. 0 The actual
arsonist-the individual who is paid to set the fire-is often more
removed from the "scam" than other principals. Organized crime's
use of arson classically involves burning as a means of extortion to
coerce property owners to participate in other crimes." To curb both
forms of organized arson it has been recently suggested that the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
statutes be reactivated. 2
Arson has received attention from both houses of Congress in the
last two years, in their efforts to enact the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1977.1 The proposed Code, S. 1437"' and H.R. 6869,11 con-
21. ARSONS, supra note 1, at 98.
22. FIREHOUSE, Oct. 1977, at 59.
23. Karchmer, Arson and the Mob: The Underworld Turns Fire Into Profit, FIREHOUSE,
Aug. 1977, at 22. See also ARSON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 16, at 5.
24. See, e.g., ABA NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMrrEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, ORGANIZED CRIME 11 (1976).
25. ARSONS, supra note 1, at 45.
26. Karchmer, The Fight Against Arson: What the Government is Doing, FIREHOUSE, Oct.
1977, at 68.
27. ARSONS, supra note 1, at 45.
28. See note 26 supra.
29. ARSONS, supra note 1, at 44.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. See note 24 supra.
32. ARSON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 16, at 8-10.
33. S.1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1437]. See also H.R.
6869, Ser. #52, pt. I, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977), entitled "Legislation to Revise and
Recodify Criminal Laws" [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6869].
34. S. 1437, supra note 33.
35. H.R. 6869, supra note 33.
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solidates approximately fifty disparate federal arson provisions
into three offenses 36 which are based generally on the proposed
format of the Model Penal Code. The Senate Committee bn the
Judiciary commented on the proposed Chapter 17: "Although the
common link of many State provisions in this area is the notion of
burning as an instrument of destruction, the approach of S. 1437 as
reported is to define the crime in series according to the nature of
the harm done or contemplated. ' 31 Under the proposed code,
arson fraud would not be covered by the arson chapter, but would
rather be included as a lesser offense related to theft.38 Despite
the implicit advantage of consolidation, this differentiation at the
very least underlines and sustains the contradictions found else-
where in the law between arson and arson fraud: the implication
different conduct. This is not borne out by the'statistics mentioned
previously, particularly with respect to financial losses and loss of
human lives.
Renewed attention to arson has also resulted in a strong response
from many states and several major cities. Arson Task Forces have
been created in Seattle, Chicago and New York. They have focused
on such projects as establishing coordinated information retrieval
systems and creating information clearing houses. 9 Special arson
squads have also been created within fire departments. In Houston,
for example, the arson squad has the sole responsibility for investi-
gation. 40 Some arson units have integrated police and fire depart-
ment personnel. 4' Others, most recently in the boroughs of the
Bronx and Brooklyn in New York City,'2 have given the police the
investigative responsibility.
36. See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany S. 1437, S. 1437, supra
note 33, at 587-94.
* 37. Id. at 588.
38, Id. (Subch. D, "Theft and Related Offenses," § 1734 "Executing a Fraudulent
Scheme"). See also Department of Justice Memorandum on the Provisions of Chapters 1
through 18 of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978. S. 1437, supra note 33, at 205-39.
39. Interview with John Engel, Mayors Task Force on Arson in New York City (February
26, 1979). Mr. Engel stated that a main objective of the Task Force would be to coordinate
information from police and insurance companies. Insureds would be required to divulge
information such as the name of the real party in interest in the property, which other
properties were similarly insured, and if there had been any previous arsons of property owned
by the insured. The system would, it is hoped, enable both insurance companies and police
in isolating potential fraud arsonists.
40. ARsONs, supra note 1, at 83.
41. Id.
42. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1979, at B8, col. 4. See also ARsoNs, supra note 1, at 61 (in
Chicago, police alone have responsibility for arson investigations).
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Arson poses important problems to be dealt with not only through
criminal prosection but also through action by private sector in-
terests, including insurance companies. The complaints about the
arson epidemic are legion: the criminal law places an impossible
burden on the prosecution which must be met by wholly circum-
stantial evidence; the insurance companies, because they must be
profit-motivated, are forced to permit the collection of claims where
an arson defense is available but time-consuming and financially
burdensome; the FAIR plans have promoted insurance scams and
encouraged arson in economically depressed neighborhoods.
This Comment will address the arson fraud "epidemic" and
divide it into two major parts. The first part will examine the crime
of arson fraud within the general context of the offense of arson.
Case law and statutory developments will be addressed, and
particular attention will be paid to three model arson statutes. The
second part will discuss various defenses potentially available to
insurers where incendiarism is suspected. These include the com-
mon law defense to arson, and several technical defenses typically
included in the standard fire insurance policies. Two unsettled
areas of the law pertaining to the arson case, the concept of "actual
cash value" and the appropriate standard of proof, will be consid-
ered. Finally, recovery of insurance proceeds by parties cointerested
with the arsonist in the destroyed property will be considered.
II. Common Law Requirements
Of The Crime Of Arson
A. Arson at Common Law
Early common law arson was classified as an infamous crime.4
The common law offense was, however, substantially more re-
stricted than present statutory offenses which cover criminal bum-
43. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIuES *220.
[Arson] is an offense of very great malignity and much more pernicious to the public
than simple theft: because first it is an offense against the right of habitation ... ;
next, because of the terror and confusion that necessarily attend it; and lastly, because
in simple theft the thing stolen only changes its master but still remains in esse for
the benefit of the public, whereas by the burning the very substance is destroyed. . ..
[Flire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons unknown to the incen-
diary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends as well as enemies.
Id. In addition to arson, "infamous" crimes included other heinous crimes such as murder
and rape. Id.
[Vol. VII .,
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ings.1 As defined by Blackstone, arson ab ardendo was "the mali-
cious and willful burning of the house or outhouse of another
man."" Limited to the burning of dwelling houses,4" common law
arson was actually an offense against the fact of habitation, 7 rather
than against the physical property damaged. The offense was di-
rected at setting fire to a house which was generally lived in,18 and,
thus, creating a potential danger to human life. Simple property
destruction, whether it be an uninhabited house or mere personal
property, was dealt with as a less serious offense."
Common law required an actual burning of the house as a result
of arson; this burning could be minimal, but it must have been
represented by certain quantifiable damage to the structure.N
At common law, an individual could not commit arson by burning
his own home" even though such act might threaten the lives of
44. For a discussion of arson at common law, see Note, Arson-Statutory Change of
Common Law Requisites, 25 MICH. L. Rav. 450 (1927).
45. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220.
46. Ex parte Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 48, 187 P.2d 411, 414 (1947); State v. Varsalona, 309
S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. 1958); State v. Arnold, 285 N.C. 751, 754, 208 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1974).
47. Lipschitz v. People, 25 Colo. 261, 266, 53 P. 1111, 1112 (1898); State v. Cooley, 176
La. 448, 454, 146 So. 19, 21 (1933) where the court, interpreting a statute, noted, "We are of
the opinion that it was the legislative intent . . . to define arson in line with the common-
law definition, as a crime against the burning of habitations rather than the burning of all
kinds of property." Id. (But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.52 (West 1974), wherein strict
common law requirement that burning be of a habitation only has been expanded to include
any property); State v. Spino, 61 Wash. 2d 246, 248, 377 P.2d 868, 869 (1963).
48. People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951), where the court defined
dwelling house in accordance with 2 D. GILLESPIE, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DUmE 819 (1949), as "any house intended to be occupied as a residence." 331 Mich. at 502,
50 N.W.2d at 143. See also State v. Long, 243 N.C. 393, 90 S.E.2d 739 (1956) where the
court stated: "An uninhabited house is not subject'to common law arson." Id. at 396, 90
S.E.2d at 741.
49. Ex parte Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 187 P.2d 411 (1947) where the court, in discussing
the development of arson, noted that other kinds of burnings should be classified as
"malicious mischief." Id. at 49, 187 P.2d at 415.
50. Lynch v. State, 370 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ind. App. 1977); State v. Schenck, 100 N.J.
Super. 122, 125, 241 A.2d 267, 268 (1968). The Schenck court stated:
Under the statute and at common law there must be an actual burning of the
dwelling house to constitute the crime of arson, although it is not necessary that the
building be wholly consumed, or even seriously damaged. If any part, however small,
is consumed it is sufficient. . . .The statute which is based on the common law...
is not violated by the burning of personal property contained in the building if no part
of the structure is damaged."
Id. at 126, 241 A.2d at 269 (citations omitted).
51. Stanley v. State, 180 Tenn. 70, 72, 171 S.W.2d 406, 407 (1943); State v. Spino, 61
Wash. 2d 246, 248, 377 P.2d 868, 869 (1963); Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wis. 358, 360, 118
N.W. 863, 864 (1908).
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persons living in the house." Ownership, however, was a term of art
in early arson cases. Since many home dwellers were tenant-
possessors, but technically not "owners" of the property, strict com-
mon law principles of ownership afforded them no legal protection
against arson. Thus, the common law, in an effort to shield tenants,
developed a specific definition of "ownership" in tenant situations
to mean "physical possession. '53 Tenants could therefore defend
against arson even when they had no legal ownership of the
property." As a direct consequence, landlords not in actual posses-
sion of the property could not have recourse in a criminal action
against an arsonist, even though the arsonist might be the tenant
in possession. This facilitated use of the early common law defini-
tion of arson as a crime directed against another, while at the same
time protecting the inhabitants. 6 In this manner, arson came to be
classified as a crime against inhabitance.57
The crime of arson, usually phrased in Blackstone's terminology,
involved two elements: willfulness and malice." Arson required a
willful burning," the intent being a general knowing and voluntary
criminal purpose.0 This intent could be inferred from the act,6 ' but
the burning must have been established as non-accidental." If in-
52. See note 51 supra.
53. See, e.g., Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 189 A. 248 (1937), where the court distin-
guished the common law from a statute, reasoning that "the rule is that an indictment for
arson should allege ownership in the one rightfully in possession of the property rather than
in the real owner .. " Id. at 372, 189 A. at 253.
54. The court in Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wis. 358, 118 N.W. 863 (1908), took note of
this anomaly:
[It is sufficient] to charge, as regards the property destroyed, that it is the dwelling
house of the one who happens to be in possession thereof as a home. . . though title
be in the person who sets the fire ...a person may be charged with being guilty of
arson by burning his own house, if it is at the time of the occurrence the home of his
tenant ...
Id. at 361, 118 N.W. at 864.
55. A. CuRTis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARSON 5, 174-76 (1933).
56. State v. Varsalona, 309 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. 1958); State v. Arnold, 285 N.C. 751,
754, 208 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1974); State v. Long, 243 N.C. 393, 396, 90 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1956).
57. State v. Copeland, 46 S.C. 13, 15, 23 S.E. 980, 981 (1896); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.
2d 246, 248, 377 P.2d 868, 869 (1963).
58. See note 45 supra.
59. Love v. State, 107 Fla. 376, 378, 144 So. 843, 843-44 (1932).
60. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 126, 230 S.E.2d 152, 157 (1976) (citing State v. Arnold,
285 N.C. 751, 208 S.E.2d 646 (1974)).
61. Lipschitz v. People, 25 Colo. 261, 268-69, 53 P. 1111, 1113 (1898).
62. State v. Bergman, 171 Wash. 67, 17 P.2d 604 (1932); see also Riddings v. State, 125
Ga. App. 334, 187 S.E.2d 555 (1972).
[Vol. VII
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tent to burn' was proven, malice could be inferred from the willful
arson.e3 The cases do no develop the concept of malice as a separate
element of the crime of arson. Rather, it is assumed that if the
willful intent is established, malice is implicit. Motive was not an
element of the crime of common law arson,"4 though some early
cases are in agreement with more recent statutory formulations in
holding that establishing motive might be valuable in finding
arson." Burning with the purpose of collecting money on insured
property at common law was not classified as an infamous crime,
presumably because it Was not an act of "arson" to set fire to one's
own home.6"
B. The Substantive Crime of Arson Fraud
The elements of common law arson, a willful and malicious burn-
ing" of a dwelling house" remain as the primary elements for a
criminal offense of arson. Statutory and case law have extended the
common law definition to include the criminal burning of virtually
every type of property,"9 even burning with intent to defraud an
insurance carrier. 0 Arson for purposes of fraud may be distinguished
from other crimes of arson in several ways: the intent required is
specific intent to defraud, the quality and substance of admissible
evidence pertains specifically to insured situations, and evidence
which relates directly to motive is more frequently admissible.
The corpus delicti of the crime of arson involves proof of two
elements: (1) that the property in question was burned7 and (2)
63. State v. Despain, 152 Wash. 488, 278 P. 173 (1929).
64. State v. Turner, 58 Wash. 2d 159, 161 n.2, 361 P.2d 581, 582 n.2 (1961) (citing Rex v.
Solomon, 168 Eng. Rep. 665 (1802)).
65. State v. Volk, 184 Wis. 286, 287-88, 199 N.W. 151, 151 (1924), where the court stated
that defendant's motive should be viewed in combination with other factors such as the time
of the fire and its incendiary character.
66. Norville v. State, 144 Tenn. 278, 230 S.W. 966 (1921) where the court noted that since
at common law it was not an offense to burn one's own property "it made no difference that
the property was insured." Id. at 280, 230 S.W. at 966.
67. State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 385, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978); Borza v. State, 25 Md.
App. 391, 405, 335 A.2d 142, 151 (1975).
68. See note 46 supra.
69. For a discussion of the various types of property which may be destroyed by arson,
see notes 146, 154, 155, 163, 200 infra and accompanying text.
70. See note 165 infra, which lists several state statutes pertaining to arson fraud.
71. "Burning" is a term of art in arson cases. In a recent Colorado case, People v. LeFebre,
190 Colo. 307, 546 P.2d 952 (1976), the court stated:
[Clourts of other jurisdictions are in general agreement that the terms "burn" or "set
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that the burning was caused by an individual with criminal intent.7"
The law presumes initially that all fires are accidental in origin.7"
The incendiary nature of a fire-that it was set with criminal in-
tent-is therefore an element to be established."
The intent to commit arson may be characterized as a general
unlawful intent75 to damage or destroy76 certain property by fire or
explosion." Arson to defraud, however, requires an additional spe-
cific intent, namely, that the property was burned for purposes of
collecting insurance, and thereby defrauding an insurance carrier."5
fire to" .. require more than a mere scorching or discoloration. "[Biurn".
is defined by the cases as ignition of or an alteration or destruction of the fiber or
texture of the materials composing the "building" or "structure." However, it is not
necessary under the cases that the entire "building" or "structure" be totally destroyed
or materially injured as long as any part of the "building" or "structure," regardless
of its size, is burned or set afire.
Id. at 311-12, 546 P.2d 955-56 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Lynch v. State, 370 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. App. 1977), an Indiana court distinguished the
terms "burning" and "set fire," holding that "the common law rigidly required an actual
burning." Id. at 403. Whereas, by present statute all that was required was some change in
the structure's composition. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-16-1-1 (Bums 1978). (For a more complete
discussion of this issue, see the dissenting opinion in Lynch, 370.N.E.2d 401, 404 (White, J.,
dissenting)). See also Washington v. State, 290 Ala. 344, 345, 276 So. 2d 587, 589 (1973); Borza
v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 397, 335 A.2d 142, 146 (1975); State v. Heard, 105 N.J. Super.
172, 174, 251 A.2d 464, 465 (1969).
72. State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 385, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978);. People v. Mooney, 127
Cal. 339, 340, 59 P. 761, 762 (1899); R.C.S. v. State, 546 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
73. State v. Bunton, 453 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Mo. 1970); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208
Va. 778, 781, 160 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1968); see also People v. Bailey, 42 Mich. App. 359, 361-
62, 202 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1972). In Bailey, the court eliminated several accidental causes for
the fire in question.
74. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 450, 492 P.2d 1, 6, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 318 (1972); State
v. Ferrara, 320 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Mo. 1958); People v. Lewis, 275 N.Y. 33, 37-38, 9 N.E.2d
765, 767 (1937).
75. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 126, 229 S.E.2d 152, 157 (1976). In White, the court
stated that "specific intent is not an essential element of the crime of arson." Id. at 126, 229
S.E.2d at 157. See also State v. Kinlaw, 150 N.J. Super. 70, 374 A.2d 1233 (1977); People v.
Roderman, 34 Misc. 2d 497, 229 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
76. People v. Mooney, 127 Cal. 339, 340, 59 P. 761, 762 (1899), where the court held that
there could be no crime of arson unless the intent to destroy was present.
77. Most recent statutes include "explosions" within the means of destruction or damage
performed by arsonists. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.10 (McKinney 1978). See also People
v. McCrawford, 47 A.D. 2d 318, 366 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1st Dep't 1975) for a discussion of
what constitutes an explosion under this statute.
78. Norville v. State, 144 Tenn. 278, 280-81, 230 S.W. 966, 967 (1921) (citing McDonald
v. People, 47 111.533 (1868)). See also Latham v. State, 88 Fla. 310, 102 So. 551 (1924); People
v. Lashkowitz, 257 A.D. 518, 13 N.Y.S.2d 663 (3d Dep't 1939); Roth v. State, 44 Ohio App.
420, 186 N.E. 7 (1933).
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Courts have continually stated that proving the crime of arson
usually requires the use of circumstantial evidence." In 1933, an
Ohio court succinctly characterized the crime as follows: "Men do
not commit the offense of arson in public. In practically every case
of arson the incendiary origin must be determined from the sur-
rounding circumstances. '8 8 Proof by circumstantial evidence, how-
ever, may not be less rigorous than proof of arson by direct evidence:
both types of evidence must still result in proof of a defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." As a West Virginia court empha-
sized, "[if] the evidence be wholly circumstantial then, it must be
of a character which excludes every reasonable hypothesis except
the one on which the condition is based." 82
Motive, on the other hand, does not strictly bear on the commis-
sion of a crime, and is generally never an element of the offense.,
However, motive may be a significant component of the corpus of
circumstantial evidence" in two significant respects. Motive may
help establish the corpus delicti by providing proof that the suspect
79. O'Brien v. State, 39 Ariz. 298, 303, 6 P.2d 421, 422 (1931); State v. Rincones, 209 Kan.
176, 178, 495 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1972); Russo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 114, 115-16, 184 N.E. 241,
241 (1933); Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 405, 335 A.2d 142, 150 (1975); People v. Bailey,
42 Mich. App. 359, 363, 202 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1972); State v. Lytle, 214 Minn. 171, 179, 7
N.W.2d 305, 309 (1943); Byrd v. State, 165 Miss. 30, 35, 143 So. 852, 852-53 (1932); People v.
Moore, 18 A.D.2d 417, 418, 239 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1070, 195
N.E.2d 894, 246 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1963); Commonwealth v. Moore, 466Pa. 510, 514, 353 A.2d
808, 810 (1976); State v. Despain, 152 Wash. 488, 491, 278 P. 173, 173-74 (1929); State v. Clay,
135 W.Va. 618, 625-26, 64 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1951).
80. Russo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 114, 115, 184 N.E. 241, 241 (1933). See also People v.
Horowitz, 37 Mich. App. 151, 194 N.W.2d 375 (1971), where the court emphasized that "[iut
is the nature of the offense of arson that it is usually committed surreptitiously. Rare is the
occasion when eyewitnesses will be available. By necessity proof will be circumstantial." Id.
at 154, 194 N.W.2d at 376.
81. Stone v. Wingo, 416 F.2d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1969).
82. State v. Clay, 135 W. Va. 618, 626, 64 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1951).
83. State v. Volk, 184 Wis. 286, 287, 199 N.W. 151, 151 (1924). The Volk court stated that
"[miotive alone will not sustain a conviction of arson." Id.
84. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). The Beagle court
stated that "motive, of course, is not an element of arson but the absence thereof may make
proof of the essential elements less persuasive." Id. at 450, 492 P.2d at 6, 99 Cal. Rptr. at
318. See also People v. Martin, 59 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788, 376 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1978) (where
evidence of motive was admissible); State v. Bergman, 171 Wash. 67, 71-72, 17 P.2d 604, 605-
06 (1932). But see Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 285, 119 A.2d 642, 644
(1956) (where proving motive was not essential); State v. Turner, 58 Wash. 2d 159, 161-62,
361 P.2d 581, 582 (1961) (where absence of motive was of no consequence). For a neutral
position on this distinction, see State v. Janasky, 258 Wis. 182, 45 N.W.2d 78 (1950).
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fire was of incendiary origin," and it may assist in circumstantially
identifying the defendant as the arsonist81 Where there is a possibil-
ity of collecting insurance on destroyed property, motive becomes
particularly relevant. 7
The fact that the property damaged was insured against loss per
se is not dispositive circumstantial evidence that arson was commit-
ted." Many courts, however, have held that proof of insurance may
facilitate finding whether an arson was committed.89 If the fact of
insurance is admitted into evidence, several additional factors con-
cerning the insurance have been held relevant in establishing arson
fraud. For example, over-insurance of property is often held to be
an indicium of motive and of intent to defraud." It has likewise been
held that purchase of insurance a short time before a fire is a signifi-
cant piece of circumstantial evidence.9 Insurance on the damaged
85. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 449-50, 492 P.2d 1, 6, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317 (1972);
People v. Bailey, 42 Mich. App. 359, 362-63, 202 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1972); People v. Schatz,
37 A.D.2d 584, 585, 322 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (lst Dep't 1971) (where court found defendants'
motive to be contrary to commission of arson).
86. People v. Martin, 59 Il1. App. 3d 785, 788, 376 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1978).
87. State v. Lytle, 214 Minn. 171, 179, 7 N.W.2d 305, 309 (1943); State v. Roth, 117 Minn.
404, 408, 136 N.W. 12, 13 (1912); Stanley. v. State, 180 Tenn. 70, 73, 171 S.W.2d 406, 407
(1943).
88. People v. Angelopoulous, 30 Cal. App.2d 588, 597, 86 P.2d 873, 878 (1939); People v.
Rosen, 251 A.D. 584, 589, 297 N.Y.S. 877, 883 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 275 N.Y. 627, 11 N.E.2d 790
(1937), It should be noted that there is a line of cases that hold that the presence of insurance
is not always relevant. See, e.g., State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933). These
cases, however, often apply in situations where the insurance was held by uninvolved third
parties. See Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188 (1931); People v. Nicolia, 287 N.Y.
398, 39 N.E.2d 929 (1942).
89. Miles v. State, 160 Fla. 523, 525, 36 So. 2d 182, 183 (1948); Russo v. State, 126 Ohio
St. 114, 116, 184 N.E. 241, 242 (1933).
90. People v. Kessler, 62 Cal. App. 2d 817, 145 P.2d 656 (1944) (insurance held was in
amount twice that of original cost of property); People v. Martin, 59 Ill. App. 3d 785, 376
N.E.2d 65 (1978) (sale value of house was $19,000 and insurance amounted to approximately
$36,000); People v. Bloodgood, 251 A.D. 593, 298 N.Y.S. 91 (3d Dep't 1937) (court found
house, worth $4,000 to $6,000, overinsured by two policies in amounts of $10,000 and $7,000);
People v. Badger, 217 A.D. 424, 216 N.Y.S. 723 (3d Dep't 1926) (court held that even slight
overinsurance might be suspicious circumstance). But see State v. Volk, 184 Wis. 286, 287,
199 NW. 151, 151 (1924) (evidence of overinsurance was held to be insufficient of itself to
find defendant guilty). See also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 338 Mass. 130, 138-39, 154
N.E.2d 130, 136 (1958) (intent to injure insurer may be found even if property is not overin-
sured).
91. Hart v. State, 144 Fla. 409, 198 So. 120 (1940) (defendant insured property and several
days later solicited another to burn it); Arnold v. State, 500 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1973) (defendant obtained $15,000 fire insurance approximately two weeks before fire). See
also State v. Berkowitz, 325 Mo. 519, 29 S.W.2d 150 (1930); State v. Ciocca, 125 Vt. 64, 209
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property about to be cancelled may also become important in prov-
ing arson."
A finding that the defendant was in a precarious financial condi-
tion and stood only to benefit from the receipt of insurance proceeds
is persuasive for establishing both motive and intent. 3 Generally,
courts have not required that the defendant have actually collected
on the policy," nor even that a claim was filed. 5 A proof of loss
which is, however, disproportionate to the actual value of the prop-
erty destroyed, may be indicative of an intent to defraud. 6 That an
insurance policy is not valid is no defense to proof of fraudulent
purpose; it is sufficient that the defendant thought the policy to be
in force. 7 Third-party insurance, held by someone other than the
A.2d 507 (1965). But see Baghramain v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 1975)
(court noted that recent purchases of insurance were only necessitated by need of defendant-
purchaser to secure interests of creditors).
92. Chaconas v. United States, 326 A.2d 792 (D.C. 1974) (insurance on property expired
one day after fire). See also State v. Lytle, 214 Minn. 171, 7 N.W.2d 305 (1943); State v.
Ciocca, 125 Vt. 64, 209 A.2d 507 (1965).
93. Commonwealth v. Valcourt, 333 Mass. 706, 133 N.E.2d 217 (1963). In Valcourt, the
court ruled that "it is competent for the Commonwealth to show that the defendant was in
financial straits." Id. at 718, 133 N.E.2d at 225.
Similarly, in Chaconas, the court held that even though defendant's bank accounts did not
demonstrate financial problems, the facts that the liquor license on the restaurant burned
had been suspended and the restaurant had generally poor credit status were dispositive. 326
A.2d 792 (D.C. 1974).
For other examples of indicia of financial problems, see State v. Latino, 25 Ariz. App. 66,
540 P.2d 1285 (1975); State v. Baron, 136 Me. 516, 8 A.2d 161 (1939) (court noted business in
burned restaurant had been bad); People v. Bailey, 42 Mich. App. 359, 202 N.W.2d 557
(1972); People v. Horowitz, 37 Mich. App. 151, 194 N.W.2d 375 (1971); State v. Smith, 149
Wis. 63, 134 N.W. 1123 (1Q12).
94. People v. Rabin, 317 Mich. 654, 666, 27 N.W.2d 126, 131 (1947); People v. Bloodgood,
251 A.D. 593, 600, 298 N.Y.S. 91, 99 (3d Dep't 1937).
95. Johns v. State, 144 Fla. 256, 197 So. 791 (1940). The court held that the pertinent
Florida statute did not require a defendant to have made a claim for insurance in order to
find him guilty of arson fraud. Id. at 262, 197 So. at 794. See also People v. Martin, 59 ll.
App. 3d 785, 788, 376 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1978).
96. State v. Ferrara, 320 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1958). In Ferrara, the court found that the proof
of loss filed was "grossly in excess of the value of the insured property destroyed in the fire."
Id. at 543. See also People v. Mix, 149 Mich. 260, 112 N.W. 907 (1907), where such evidence
was held to have "a bearing on defendant's motives." Id. at 262, 112 N.W. at 908. But see
State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933), where the proof of loss was commensurate
with the value of the property destroyed. Id. at 333, 17 P.2d at 922. The court also held such
circumstantial evidence insufficient to establish defendant's guilt. Id. at 334-35, 17 P.2d at
923.
97. State v. Roth, 117 Minn. 404, 407-08, 136 N.W. 12, 13 (1912) (validity of insurance
contract was immaterial); Norville v. State, 144 Tenn. 278, 280, 230 S.W. 966, 966 (1921)
(enforceability of insurance contract was not element of arson offense).
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accused, is similarly not an absolute manifestation of innocence."8
The varieties of circumstantial evidence admissible in general
arson cases may also be admitted in arson fraud prosecutions, and
are principally used to prove the threshold elements that the fire
was of incendiary origin and that the defendant was the arsonist.
The presence of the defendant near or at the scene prior to, dur-
ing, or after the fire may assist in proving the corpus delicti." Simi-
larly, statements by the defendant, either as confessions'0 0 or as
admissions0 ' may be considered with other evidence to establish
criminal agency.
98. See note 88 supra.
99. Rausch v. State, 159 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 1964) (defendant was at scene fifteen
minutes before fire was discovered); People v. Bailey, 42 Mich. App. 359, 362, 202 N.W.2d
557, 559 (1972) (defendant was in house alone for between ten and twenty minutes before
fire); State v. Despain, 152 Wash. 488, 489, 278 P. 173, 173 (1929) (defendant was outside
house during fire).
In a non-fraud arson case, State v. Turner, 58 Wash. 2d 159, 361 P.2d 581 (1961), the
defendant's presence at the scene and his conversation with the fire department giving the
exact location of the fire were held dispositive. Id. at 160-61, 361 P.2d at 582. See also Watt
v. State, 193 Tenn. 257, 246 S.W.2d 4 (1952) (defendant was fully dressed at scene of fire
which occurred late at night): But see Hines v. State, 34 Md. App. 612, 368 A.2d 509 (1977),
where the court held that the time when the defendant left the scene did not constitute proof
of the corpus delicti. Id. at 617, 368 A.2d at 512. See also People v. Miller, 55 I1. App. 3d
421, 370 N.E.2d 1155 (1977).
In R.C.S. v. State, 546 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), the court diminished the im-
portance of the defendant's presence at the scene of the fire. The R.C.S. court stated: "It
is common knowledge that conflagrations attract spectators . . . [defendant's presence] tells
nothing concerning the origin of the fire, although it may form some basis for conclusions
concerning human nature." Id. at 943.
100. See Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 335 A.2d 142 (1975), for a discussion of the use
of confessions. In Borza, the court (citing Bollinger v. State, 208 Md. 298, 307, 117 A.2d 913,
917 (1955)), noted "the general truism that confession of crime alone will not sustain a.con-
viction, and that ordinarily the confession should not be the first item of the state's proof."
25 Md. App. at 402, 335 A.2d at 149.
101. People v. Martin, 59 Il1. App. 3d 85, 376 N.E.2d 65 (1978) (defendants discussed
among themselves burning house to collect insurance). In State v. Korth, 38 S.D. 539, 162
N.W. 144 (1917), the Supreme Court of South Dakota permitted evidence of a two-year old
statement by the defendant that he would not build a new barn until his old barn had burned.
The court noted "the length of time would impair the probative force of the statement, but
would not render it inadmissible." Id. at 544, 162 N.W. at 145.
An interesting case where the court permitted an admission to be used was State v. Turner,
58 Wash. 2d 159, 361 P.2d 581 (1961). In that case, the Washington court admitted evidence
that the defendant placed a telephone call to the fire department, precisely identifying the
location of the fire in the building, as he was on his way out. As the court noted, the evidence
was probative even absent a showing of motive because "only the appellant knew it." Id. at
161, 361 P.2d at 582. See also People v. Ales, 247 N.Y. 351, 355, 160 N.E. 395, 221 N.Y.S.
847 (1928) (court permitted admission of statement by defendant to fire marshal because it
found such statement voluntary).
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Expert opinion by fire and insurance investigators is admissible
to demonstrate the non-accidental nature of the burning.02 Such
testimony is restricted, however, to testimony on the technical char-
acteristics of the suspicious fire.0 3
The presence of inflammable materials, such as gas, kerosene,
newspapers, and containers, are especially persuasive on the issue
of intentional burning. 04 Specific facts concerning the condition of
the building, such as the condition of the electric wiring and fuses,
may also be significant evidence. 05
One kind of circumstantial evidence which is particularly persu-
asive in arson fraud cases is proof that the defendant removed
goods, stock, and other items of personal property from the struc-
ture burned during the period of time immediately preceding the
fire. 10 Such evidence tends to support a motive and to reinforce the
102. Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 180 Pa. Super. 279, 119 A.2d 642 (1956). In admitting
expert opinion evidence given by a Fire Captain or Fire Marshal, the court noted that
"necessity is the ground of admissibility of such evidence." Id. at 282, 119 A.2d at 643. The
court further commented, however, that other courts are "hopelessly in conflict" concerning
the admissibility of such testimony. Id.
103. Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 376, 189 A. 248, 255 (1936); State v. Lytle, 214 Minn.
171, 179, 7 N.W.2d 305, 309 (1943). But see Harris v. Commonwealth, 342 S.W.2d 535 (Ky.
1960), where the court held opinion evidence as to the incendiary nature 6f the fire inadmis-
sible. Id. at 541.
104. State v. Baron, 136 Me. 516, 8 A.2d 161 (1939) (oil-saturated rags, coating of oil on
floor found); People v. Mix, 149 Mich. 260, 112 N.W. 907 (1907) (defendant placed jug of
kerosene in house); State v. Ferrara, 320 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1958) (testimony concerning.
detection of odor of gasoline); State v. Berkowitz, 325 Mo. 519, 29 S.W.2d 150 (1930) (odor'
of gasoline and presence of two glass jars with gas-like substance); People v. Moore, 18 A.D.
2d 417, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 967 (3d Dep't 1963) (towel saturated with gas found over hot plate);
Russo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 114, 184 N.E. 241 (1933) (fireman found gasoline-soaked rags);
Arnold v. State, 500 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973) (gas-soaked rug at scene);
State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933) (defendant had two ten gallon cans of gas
in the car which was located next to the burning building); State v. Ciocca, 125 Vt. 64, 209
A.2d 507 (1965) (suspects apprehended with newspapers and two gallon jugs).
.Compare State v. Latino, 25 Ariz. App. 66, 540 P.2d 1285 (1975) (five-gallon cans found at
the scene of two fires) with People v. Ice, 265 A.D. 46, 38 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't 1942) (where
presence of gas can on second floor of burned building was held not dispositive).
105. Baghramain v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 315 So.'2d 849, 852 (La. App. 1975); Borza v.
State, 25 Md. App. 391, 393, 335 A.2d 142, 144 (1975).
106. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 59 Il. App. 3d 785, 376 N.E.2d 65 (1978) (defendant
removed personal belongings from house prior to fire); Gipson v. State, 162 Miss. 480, 139
So. 868 (1932) (evidence that defendant had concealed dashboard and missing parts of auto
which he burned); State v. Berkowitz, 325 Mo. 519, 29 S.W.2d 150 (1930) (defendant seen
putting "bundles" containing merchandise from his store into his car); Commonwealth v.
Nasuti, 180 Pa. Super. 279, 119 A.2d 642 (1956) (no supplies or food were found in restaurant
which burned); Watt v. State, 193 Tenn. 257, 246 S.W.2d 4 (1952) (defendant removed
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element of criminal intent. Finally, the fact that a defendant sus-
tained physical injuries as a direct result of the fire may be admissi-
ble as evidence suggesting his or her culpability. 07
Accessorial liability has been eliminated for both general and
fraud arson. One who assists in the commission of an arson is pres-
ently punishable as a principal, and deemed to have the requisite
intent.08 Hypothetically, at least, such principal liability could be
difficult to sustain in some cases of arson fraud; it is conceivable
that a person who actually fires a building or other property for the
benefit of another person, may not do so with the knowledge that
such destruction is for the purpose of collecting insurance money.
Most cases of this kind which have been prosecuted, however, in-
volve knowing agents.' Evidence which is admissible on this ques-
tion is usually circumstantial evidence in that a promise was made
for payment from insurance proceeds," or that actual payment was
from such funds."'
III. Statutory Formulations of The
Crime of Arson
A. Model Legislation
Three major pieces of model arson legislation have been written
in the last thirty years: the Model Arson Law,"' the Model Penal
furniture from house whiich was burned one week later); Gamble v. State, 159 Tenn. 446, 19
S.W.2d 279 (1929) (after fire, house found stripped of valuable furnishings); State v. Smith,
149 Wis. 63, 134 N.W. 1123 (1912) (defendant removed most of furniture from house immedi-
ately before mortgage was foreclosed).
107. State v. Sotteriou, 132 N.J. Super. 403, 334 A.2d 47 (1975), where the defendant
admitted himself to the hospital claiming that he had been attacked, injured and kidnapped
by two unknown assailants. It was proved, instead, that the injuries were sustained in the
arson attempt. Id. at 408, 334 A.2d at 49.
108. State v. Ciocca, 125 Vt. 64, 209 A.2d 507 (1965). The Ciocca court stated that "[tJhe
fact that those employed did not accomplish [arson] does not relieve the respondent of his
guilt." Id. at 73, 209 A.2d at 514. See also State v. Tsiolis, 202 Minn. 117, 277 N.W. 409 (1938).
See the following cases as examples of conspiracies to commit arson: State v. Colton, 174
Conn. 135, 384 A.2d 343 (1977); State v. Daugherty, 221 Kan. 612, 562 P.2d 42 (1977); State
v. Theodore, 392 A.2d 122 (N.H. 1978).
109. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 117 Minn. 404, 407, 136 N.W. 12, 13 (1912). But see People
v. Rabin, 317 Mich. 654, 661, 27 N.W.2d 126, 129 (1947). The Rabin court found that the
evidence was insufficient on the question of whether one agent knew of the existence of the
insurance.
110. See, e.g., State v. Ciocca, 125 Vt. 64, 209 A.2d 507 (1965) (where defendant hired
another to burn building promising payment from expected insurance proceeds).
111. See, e.g., State v. Ettenberg, 145 Minn. 39, 176 N.W. 171 (1920).
112. NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS, SUGGESTIONS FOR ARSON INVESTIGATORS 45-
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Code Section 220, "Arson and Related Offenses,"' 3 and the Model
Arson Penal Law."4 Each model statute represents an effort at re-
classifying and consolidating previous disparate common law and
statutory criminal provisions."'
The Model Arson Law, written by the National Board of Fire
Underwriters, was the first effort at creating a comprehensive stat-
ute which would deal with the various kinds of criminal burnings.
Although it was adopted by several states," ' it has been widely
criticized." 7
The Model Arson Law retains the common law concern for dwell-
ing houses and contiguous buildings, while dispensing with the own-
ership requirements. 8 For example, first degree arson is defined as
"willfully and maliciously . . . burning . . . any dwelling house
?YI'"
. . . or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse ... .
Similar burning of other non-dwelling (and therefore potentially
46 (1956), reprinted in ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1, Appendix to Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 11, 1960) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ARSON LAw].
113. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 112, § 220.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
114. Alliance of American Insurers, American Insurance Association, National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers, "Model Arson Penal Law, Offenses Against Property, Article
100, Arson, Criminal Mischief and Other Property Destruction" (Jan. 1, 1978) (presented
with other materials at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association on August 9,
1978) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ARSON PENAL LAW].
115. The discussion in this Comment will be confined to model legislation and will not
include a discussion of actual statutes upon which many states may have based their own
arson legislation. See, e.g., the New York arson statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.00 (McKinney
1978), from which several othef states modeled their arson legislation.
116. See, e.g., the former Montana statute, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-501 (1977), and
the previous Minnesota arson provisions, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.56 (advisory committee
comment) (West Supp..1978), which stated that the statute was based on the Model Arson
Law. For an early commentary discussing the advantages of the Modem Arson Law, see
Braun, Legal Aspects of Arson, 43 J. CRiM L., C. & P.S. 53 (1952).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1, Comment at 35-36. The American Law Institute stated:
It is subject to grave criticism on the ground that the system of classifying offenses is
abritrary from the penological point of view. For example, the burning of an empty,
isolated dwelling may lead to a 20 year sentence, while setting fire to a crowded church,
theater or jail is a lesser offense. The destruction of a large dam, factory, or public
service facility is regarded less seriously than destruction of a private garage on the
grounds of a suburban home. Moreover, it makes little sense to treat the burning of
miscellaneous personal property, whether out of malice or to defraud insurers, as a
specific category of crime apart from risks associated with burning.
Id. at 35.
118. MODEL.ARSON LAW, supra note 112, at 50-51. The first and second degree offenses,
for example, provide in their definition that the named property is protected "whether the
property of himself or of another. Id.
119. Id. at 50.
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uninhabited) buildings is classified as a lesser offense.' 20 Separate
provision is made for arson to defraud an insurer, whether it be
burning of real or personal property. 2' Arson to defraud, however,
is classified as an offense of only the fourth degree,' thus allowing
for the potential anomaly of an arson of an insured inhabited build-
ing, which could be a first degree offense, being prosecuted as an
arson to defraud, a lesser offense. Further evidence that the Model
Arson Law considers this type of arson to be less serious is found in
the fact that the only other classification similar in degree to fraud
arson is attempt arson.2 3 Accessories to an arson are liable as princi-
pals under this model.' 4
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, in article 220,
provides a similarly comprehensive approach to statutory arson.' 5
The Code makes only two categorical distinctions between felony
arsons: the first, "arson," is classified as a second degree felony,'2 1
and the second, "reckless burning or exploding," is a third degree
felony. '2 Other types of property destruction by fire, chiefly result-
ing from negligence, are classified as misdemeanors. 2 1
120. Id. at 50-51. The second degree arson statute reads:
Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned,
or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any building or structure of whatsoever
class or character, whether the property of himself or of another, not included or
described in the preceding section, shall be guilty of Arson in the second degree, and
upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more
than ten years.
Id. The penalty for a conviction of Arson in the first degree Is not less than two nor more than
twenty years. Id. at 50.
121. Id. at 51. ("Burning to Defraud Insurer," included within fourth degree section).
122. Id. This degree of arson carries a penalty of from one to five years.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., the first and second degree statutes which name as potential principals to
the crimes anyone who "aids, counsels or procures the burning" of the classified structures.
Id. at 50-51.
125. See note 113 supra. The authors of the Model Penal Code, in their official Comment
to § 220.1 explained their approach:
We grade the offense partly according to the kind of property destroyed or imperilled
and partly according to danger to the person. . . .[W]e define a single class of more
serious burnings, viz. of a "building or occupied structure." Within this broad cate-
gory, the treatment agencies can do better than the legislature in proportioning punish-
ment to the actor's demonstrated indifference to human life and other variables in his
personality and behavior.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1, Comment at 37.
126. Id. § 220.1(1).
127. Id. § 220.1(2).
128. Id. § 220.1(3).
1979] ARSON FRAUD
Arson, the second degree felony, is defined in more general terms
than in previous legislation. Property is not specified, except with
reference to the degree of damage: "arson" is the destruction of a
"building or occupied structure""'2 or the damage or destruction of
any property if the crime is arson fraud. 30 Danger to human lives
is an implicit element of section 220.1(1).' 3'
The Model Penal Code provisions covering arson fraud are quali-
tatively different from the Model Arson Law. Under the Code, arson
of any property with intent to collect insurance is punishable as a
second degree felony' 32 and therefore is commensurate in seriousness
with arson of occupied dwellings. In fact, as mentioned, the only
Model Penal Code arson-related felony of a lesser degree is the
offense of reckless burning. 33 This section provides for criminal
sanction if an otherwise permissible burning or exploding endangers
either life or property. Further, unlike the Model Arson Law, the
Model Penal Code does not set a lower value limitation on the
burning of personal property.' 34 The Model Penal Code provisions
have not been widely accepted directly, but several states have
directly, but several states have fashioned their arson statutes on
the principles expressed in Article 220.' 3
129. Id. § 220.1(1)(a). See also id. § 220.1(4), the definitional section, which defines
"occupied structure" to include "a ship, trailer, sleeping car, or other vehicle adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a
person is actually present." Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. § 220.1(1)(b).
131. See the definition set forth at note 129 supra. See also MODEL PENAL CODE §
220.1(2)(a).
132. Id. § 220.1(1)(b). As the authors noted in the Comment to this provision:
Arson for insurance is perhaps the most frequent and dangerous behavior in the field.
Often the property involved is a stock of merchandise which would not be a building
or structure within clause (a) of subsection (1), and any burning of the structure
incidental to the destruction of the goods would not be purposeful as required by clause
(a). Accordingly, clause (b) makes it a felony of the second degree to burn one's own
property with purpose to collect insurance. The last sentence of clause (b) serves as a
reminder to prosecutors and judges that the heavy penalties of arson are not intended
for behavior which, while objectionable as part of a fraudulent scheme, has no element
of general or personal danger.
Id. § 220.1, Comment at 40-41.
See § 220.1(1)(b) which includes the affirmative defense provision available if the individ-
ual "did not recklessly endanger any building or occupied structure of another or place any
other person in danger of death or bodily injury."
133. Id. § 220.1(2).
134. Compare id. with MODEL ARSON LAW, supra note 112, at 51. A third degree offense
under the Modern Arson Law is limited to burning property worth $25 or more.
135. The commentaries to the following state arson statutes have cited the MODEL PENAL
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Recently, the Alliance of American Insurers, the American Insur-
ance Association and the National Association of Independent In-
surers proposed a Model Arson Penal Law, entitled "Arson, Crimi-
nal Mischief and Other Property Destruction.' '13  While it is quite
similar in its provisions to the Model Penal Code, it may be distin-
guished on several points.
First, the Model Arson Penal Law includes a first degree felony
offense of "aggravated arson.' '1 37 This provision is similar to the
Model Penal Code section 220.1(1)(a), but makes specific provision
for resulting death or bodily injury. 13 The second 39 and third,"
degree offenses resemble the Code provisions as well, but include
unoccupied structures."' Section 100.1(2)(b) of the Model Arson
Penal Law provides for arson of any property for purposes of de-
frauding an insurer. Unlike the' Model Penal Code, however, the
statute allows for a property valuation to be written in.' This open
valuation provision is also included in the section dealing with reck-
less buring.'4 3 Finally, the Model Arson Penal Law has added to
each of its three felony sections provisions which include accessorial
liability.' 4
B. State Statute Survey
Codification of arson, from the common law offense into a statu-
tory crime, has by no means been uniformly accomplished. Some
state codes continue to make the common law-based distinctions
between dwelling houses and other types of buildings' and among
CODE as authority: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to 823
(1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (1977); Miss, CODE ANN. §§ 14.040-.050 (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1978). Other states cite to these statutes: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §
803 (citing to Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 14.040-.050 (1973), Commentary) and KAN. STAT. § 21-3718
(1974) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1, Comment).
136. See note 114 supra.
137. MODEL ARSON PENAL LAW § 100.1(1).
138. Id. § 100.1(1)(b).
139. Id. § 100.1(2).
140. Id. § 100.1(3).
141. The language used in id. § 100.1(2)(a) is "a building or unoccupied structure" while
id. § 100.1(3)(b) simply states "a building or structure . . . whether occupied or not."
142. Id. § 100.1(2)(b) states "destroying or damaging any real or any personal property
having a value of $__ or more, whether his own or another's, to collect insurance for such
loss."
143. Id. § 100.1(3)(c).
144. Id. §§ 100.1(1)-(3). Representative language for each section is "aids, counsels or
procures the setting of a fire or causing of an explosion." Id. § 100.1(2).
145. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 16-11-110 (1977) defining arson of dwelling houses, whereas
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several kinds of personal property.' Some statutes still differen-
tiate between occupancy and vacancy.'47 The common law concern
with ownership-possession has been generally dispensed with,'
eliminating the difficulties mentioned above. Arson fraud, how-
ever, remains a separate statute in many states."' In these states it
is often a comparatively less serious offense. 50
As a heuristic device, it is useful for purposes of this Comment to
consider arson statutes with respect to their fitting into one of four
categories: (1) statutes which on their face derive from the common
law or are based on a form similar to the Model Arson Law, and
therefore have separate statutory provisions for the crime of arson
to defraud an insurer; (2) statutes which are in format based upon
the Model Penal Code, including arson fraud as one aspect of the
general offense of arson, and which may also have an additional
degree of offense for aggravated arson, an element of the broad
offense of arson; (3) statutes derived from the Model Penal Code
in principle, but which maintain separate arson fraud provisions;
and (4) statutes which may be similar, either in theory or form to
the preceding, but which are substantially distinct.
1. Common Law and Model Arson Law Derivatives
North Carolina is the only state which maintains the common law
to govern cases involving arson of dwellings. 5' The codification or
id. § 16-11-120 covers burning of other kinds of property. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2
to 4-3 (1957).
146. See, e.g., statutes from the following states which distinguish some of the more
esoteric criminal burnings according to specific kinds of property damaged: MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 10A (1957) ("Burning Cross or Other Religious Symbol"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 507 (1974) ("Burning Forests"); WYo. STAT. § 6-126 (1959) ("Burning Woods or Prairie
Belonging to Another").
147. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 18.2-77 (Supp. 1978) which qualifies the designated structures
with the words "in which persons usually dwell" and states a lesser offense for burning
unoccupied buildings. But see the statutes cited in note 159 infra.
148. For example, many statutes now include a phrase similar to one in the Model Arson
Law, "whether the property of himself or another." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 447a (West
Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 801 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.010 (1973); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1973); VA. CODE § 18-2-77 (Supp. 1978); Wvo. STAT. § 6-
121 (1959).
149. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 6-125 (1959) ("Arson to Defraud Insurer").
150. Arson fraud carries a penalty of one to five years, id., whereas arson of dwellings
carries a penalty of two to twenty years. Id. § 6-121.
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58, Commentary (1969). But see the Rhode Island statutes
which presumably retain arson at common law: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-1 (1957) defines the
penalty for common law arson, while id. § 11-4-2 (1957) technically covers a non-common law
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arson-related offenses involves those crimes not contemplated at
common law. For example, there are North Carolina statutes which
prescribe punishment for arson,152 attempt,'53 arson of non-
dwellings,5 ' of specific types of property, 5 and two statutes relating
to arson to defraud. 5 6
A majority of arson statutes in force at present resemble the pro-
posed Model Arson Law.'57 Although the commentary to some of
these statutes makes explicit reference to the Model Arson Law,56
it can be said that many are common law-derivative. This is most
easily demonstrated by a multiplicity of property-specific arson
statutes.
The common law distinctions are generally retained in a primary
arson statute which represents the most serious offense. These de-
rivative chapters will often have a highest-degree offense which cod-
ifies the common law. This statute will concern burning of dwelling
houses and outbuildings reasonably expected to be located close
enough to the dwelling to be potentially endangered by fire.'" Fol-
arson ("the burning whereof shall not be arson at common law"). By definition, however, the
latter statute provides for the traditional elements of the offense: intentional and malicious
burning of "any dwelling ... or other outhouse." Id. For these reasons, the author considers
the Rhode Island statutes to be common law derivative and distinguishable from the North
Carolina provisions where the common law crime is implicit.
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1969).
153. Id. §§ 14-61, -67.
154. Id. § 14-60 (burning of schools, colleges); id. § 14-62 (churches, offices, mills, shops,
granaries); id § 14-61 (buildings under construction); id. § 14-64 (ginhouses and tobacco
houses).
155. Id. § 14-66 (covering burning of personal property); id. § 14-63 (covering burning of
boats and barges).
156. See notes 165 & 171 infra and accompanying text.
157. The author identified 21 states having statutory schemes similar to the Model Arson
Law or to a general common law perspective. They include: CAL. PENAL CODE § 447a (West
Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-14 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 8 (1979); MD. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 6-11 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
th. x (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.56 et seq. (West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-
17-1, -17-11 (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. art, 15 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. art. 15 (1969); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, ch. 56 (West Supp. 1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 11, ch. 4 (1957); S.C. CODE §
16-11-110 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 22-33 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 39, ch. 5
(1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 11 (1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-77 to -.2-87.1 (Supp. 1978);
WASH. REy. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020, .48.030; W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 to 3-5 (1977); Wis. STAT.
ANN. tit. xlv, ch. 943 (West 1977); Wyo. STAT. 6-121 to -128 (1959).
158. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.56, Advisory Committee Comment at 521 (West
1978) (this statute was substantively repealed and replaced by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561
(West Supp. 1978)).
159. The usual form is "any dwelling . .. or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable, or other
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lowing the form of the Model Arson Law, the statutes generally
dispense with any occupancy requirement,'60 but the principle of
placing a high value on potentially occupiable structures remains.,"
The second statute in derivative groupings generally covers the
crime of burning buildings and other structures not used as dwell-
ings.' 2 These provisions are followed by one or several lesser offenses
involving the burning of certain personal property."'3 Attempt stat-
utes are then included."'4
States which by statute build upon a common law concept of
outhouse. ... See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 447a (West Supp. 1978) (which adds "trailer
coaches"); IDAHO CODE § 18-801 (1978); MD. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1401 (West Supp. 1978-79); S.C. CODE § 16-11-120 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
502 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 6-121 (1959) (which adds standing
timber to appurtenant fixtures).
160. See, e.g., VT. ANN. STAT. tit. 13, § 502 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1977).
161. Some states define "dwelling" at length. For example, GA. CODE ANN. § 1401(b)
(1978) states "any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft or other structure ...if such
structure is designed for use as a dwelling." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 1 (West Supp.
1978) states "dwelling house shall mean and include all buildings used as dwellings such as
apartment houses, tenement houses, hotel, boarding houses, dormitories, hospitals, institu-
tions, sanatoria or other buildings where persons are domiciled." VA. CODE § 18.2-77 (Supp.
1978) states "any dwelling house or other house trailer. . . any hotel, hospital or asylum, or
other house in which persons usually dwell or lodge, or any railroad car, boat, or vessel, or
river craft in which persons usually dwell or lodge, or any jail or prison." But see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.562 (West Supp. 1978) which simply states "any building that is used as a dwelling
at the time the act is committed.
162. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 448a (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1402
(1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-802 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.73 (1968); MD. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 7 (1976); S.C. CODE § 16-11-120 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1975); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §,503 (1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-79 (1975) (which covers arson of "any meeting
house, courthouse, townhouse, college, academy, schoolhouse, or other building erected for
public use .. .or any banking house, warehouse, storehouse, manufactory, mill or other
house . . . not usually occupied by persons lodging therein") and VA. CODE § 18.2-80 (1975)
(covering "any building, bridge, lock, dam, or other structure"); Wyo. STAT. § 6-121 (1959);
MODEL ARSON LAW, supra note 112, at 50.
163. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 449a (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-14 (1978);
IDAHO CODE § 18-803 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 8 (1976); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.74 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.563 (West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-7
(1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.020 (1973); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1402(a) (West Supp. 1978-
79); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-4 (1957); S.C. CODE § 16-11-140 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
504 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-3 (1977).
164. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 5A (West Supp.
1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-9 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.025 (1973); S.C. CODE § 16-
11-190 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 505 (1974). But see VA. CODE § 18.2-77 (Supp. 1978)
which includes accessories as principals in the offense. See also IDAHO CODE § 18-801 (1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West Supp. 1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAws .§ 11-4-2 (1957);
W. VA. CODE § 61-3-1 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 6-121 (1959).
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arson, augmenting their codes to cover a variety of specific possible
burnings, significantly create a separate offense of arson for pur-
poses of defrauding an insurer. l6 5 It is apparent from examining
many of these statutes that arson fraud, at least at the time of
codification, was not interpreted as a crime equal in severity to
arson committed either wantonly or for revenge.' Three states,
Maryland,' Rhode Island,' and South Carolina'.6 have penal code
provisions for arson fraud of personal property only. Virginia 7" and
North Carolina' have separate statutes for such arson of either real
or personal property. The remaining derivative codes provide for
arson fraud of both real and personal property.' Some states make
a further distinction: the arson must have been committed with
intent to defraud an insurance carrier who has insured the property
against fire loss. 7 3
2. Model Penal Code Style Statutes
Several states have rewritten their arson statutes to conform, in
greater or lesser degree, with the proposed Model Penal Code arson
section 220.1.'1 These statutes share the features which distinguish
165. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 450a (West Supp. 1978); MD. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9
(1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 10 (1968); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.75 (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.611 (West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-11 (1973); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 205.030 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-65, -66 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1403(b) (West Supp. 1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-5 (1957); S.C. CODE § 16-11-130 (1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-506 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 506 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-5
(1977): Wvo. STAT. § 6-125 (1959). Of the common law derivative statutes, neither Idaho nor
Washington provides for arson fraud. But see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A-56.010(4) (1977)
("Deception") which would probably cover the offense.
166. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1974) provides a penalty of two to ten years for first
degree arson, while id. § 506 provides a penalty of from one to five years for arson to defraud.
167. MD. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9 (1976).
168. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-5 (1957).
169. S.C. CODE § 16-11-130 (1957).
170. VA. CODE § 18.2-80 (1975) applies to buildings, while id. § 18.2-81 applies to personal
property.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-65 (1969) covers arson fraud of dwelling houses, while id. § 14-
66 includes arson fraud of personal property.
172. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-11 (1973) which covers arson fraud of "any build-
ing, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class or character."
173. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 10 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 750.75 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-11 (1973); NEy. REV. STAT. § 205.030 (1973); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1403(B) (West Supp. 1978-79); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-506 (1975); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 506 (1974); Wvo. STAT. § 6-125 (1959).
174. The statutes included in this section of the article have not necessarily been attrib-
uted to the Model Penal Code formulations. It is the author's assumption that they are Model
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the Code from previous model legislation.
The categorization of different offenses based on possible types of
property is eliminated, generally in favor of two broad classifica-
tions: "building or occupied structure",'75 or simply "property."' 7
The degree scheme is based on a synthesization of those factors
which had previously served to segregate criminal burnings into a
multiplicity of degrees of seriousness: namely, the general property
type, the potential harm, and in a few cases, the value of the prop-
erty damaged.'77 Most of these statutes retain an emphasis on en-
dangering life as an indicium of severity. Some statutes, consistent
with the Model Penal Code formula, incorporate language covering
endangerment of persons or property, resultant injury and reckless-
ness.178 Many statutes, however, go beyond the Code proposals, cre-
ating a specific first degree offense of aggravated arson which ad-
dresses that form of arson which does or could result in injury to
persons. 7 ' In one sense, such aggravated arson statutes reaffirm the
common law value placed on, burning inhabited structures."" But
inclusion of such offenses within arson codes should not be inter-
preted as a move away from the Model Penal Code provisions.
These state statutes maintain the intention of creating an inclusive
offense of arson, generally incorporated as a primary arson offense,
Penal Code-style statutes, based on a number of factors'developed infra; specifically, the
manner of degree classification and the content of the specific provisions.
175. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 21-3718(a) (1974) ("any building or property"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 17-1(b)(2) (West 1978) (effective Sept. 1, 1979) ("building or occupied structure");
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 3301(b)(1) (Purdon 1973) ("building or occupied structure"); TEXAS
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 28.02 (Vernon 1974) ("building or habitation").
176. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 802(A), (B) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634.1
(1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102(a) (1978). But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1(b) (1977).
177. See, e.g., the New Hampshire arson statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634.1(111)
(1977), which includes in the alternative, arson fraud, arson with incumbent injury, and
arson which results in "pecuniary loss ... in excess of one thousand dollars." See also Oio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.03(B) which grades the offense according to the value of the property
damaged.
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1; see, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 802(B)(2) (1977).
179. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-111 (1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (West
Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3719 (1974); ME. REV. STAT; tit. 17-A, § 801 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 634.1(H1) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a) (West 1978); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2909.02 (Page 1975); .UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (1978). The Pennsylvania statute is more
explicit: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3301(a) (Purdon 1973) is entitled "Endangering Persons"
and creates a first degree felony for such arson.
180. See, e.g., the Ohio aggravated arson statute, OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.02(A)(2)
(Page 1975) which defines the offense as causing "physical harm to any occupied structtire."
Id. (emphasis added).
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which crime is often graded as a second degree offense."'
One significant change based on the Model Penal Code and which
all these statutes embody; in the inclusion, in the primary offense,
of arson with intent to defraud an insurer. 8 1 Obviously, this repre-
sents a marked departure from previous codification. It not only
links arson fraud conceptually with the traditional expressions of
the crime, but it generally upgrades the offense to a degree reflecting
contemporary perceptions of the seriousness of any form of mali-
cious willful burning.
8 3
3. Modified Model Penal Code Style Statutes
There are several states which have revised their arson statutes,
embodying the principles suggested by the Model Penal Code, but
which do not include arson fraud within the core legislation.'84 For
these statutes, arson with intent to defraud an insurer remains a
lesser offense,'85 if included within the arson provisions at all. 6 In
some instances, arson fraud is considered only parenthetically, as
included in all burnings "for unlawful purposes.'
' 87
181. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 21-3718 (1974) (which includes as arson, property damage by
fire and arson fraud, both being Class C felonies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3301(b) (Purdon
1973).
182. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-112(a)(1)(bi (1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-
1(b) (1977); KAN. STAT. § 21-3718(1)(b) (1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 802(1)(B)(1)
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634.1(I1)(a) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(b) (West
1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3301(b)(3) (Purdon 1973); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN tit. 7, §
2802(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) (limited to burning of buildings).
183. See note 182 supra. But see TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 28.02 (practice commen-
tary) (Vernon 1974), which notes that arson fraud in Texas is confined to such burning of
real property: "The burning of other insured property with intent to collect insurance pre-
viously covered by Penal Code art. 1322 poses less danger to persons and consequently is not
included in arson." Id. at 9 (practice commentary).
184. The author has identified the following state statutes as comprising this category:
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1901 to -1904 (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-4-104 to -4-105 (1974);
Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 513 (1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.050-.110 (1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
tit. 94, ch. 5 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-501 to -506 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE art. 12.1-21
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.305-.335 (1977).
185. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-104 (1974) (where arson fraud is a class four felony and arson
class three felony). Compare MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6-102(c) (1977) (criminal mischief
which carries a penalty of up to six months imprisonment) with id. § 94-6-104 (1977) (arson
which carries penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment). NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-505 (1977)
(burning to defraud insurer class four felony).
186. Such arson is not included in the arson related sections of the following codes: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1901 to -1904 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.020 (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-21-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.315, .325, .335 (1977).
187. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.050 (1978); Comment to PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE
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4. Hybrid Formulations
The remaining state arson statutes in general represent a middle
ground between the Model Arson Law-common law and Model
Penal Code approaches. Several of these statutes are revisions from
earlier common law provisions,"18 and in this respect may have con-
solidated disparate specific arson offenses.' 9 For many of these
codes, however, arson to defraud is either covered by a separate
statute,"' or is not included at all."' Examination of a few specific
arson chapters will better illustrate the disparaties.
A few statutes restrict arson to structures"' or buildings."13 For
example, the Florida statute, a single code provision presumptively
covering all proscribed burnings, refers only to damage to struc-
tures."'4 The Delaware arson statute applies to damage to buildings
alone. ' 5 The Arizona"' and. South Dakota"7 statutes continue to
8.14.050, where the authors state: "An actor may be convicted of arson . . . if his purpose in
acting is unlawful." Id. For example, it is arson to "burn one's own building in order to collect
the fire insurance because it is unlawful to defraud an insurer." Id. Further, the authors
explain that such interpretation facilitates arson prosecution by eliminating the necessity of
proof of "fraudulent intent." Id.
188. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1979) (replacing IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
16-1-1 (Burns 1976)), The original statutory scheme resembled the Model Arson Law pro-
visions categorizing properties and including an arson fraud offense. The current statute
synthesizes the offenses according to endangerment of life and the value of the property.
Although arson-for-hire is included, there is not specific arson fraud.
189. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1-.4 (West 1978). This group of offenses is graded
according to endangerment of life and property value. The third degree arson offense, § 712.4,
is defined as "arson which is not arson in the first degree or arson in the second degree,"
presumably covering all other criminal burnings. Id. The definitional section, id. § 712.1,
includes arson with intent to defraud an insurer.
190. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.53 (West 1974).
191. See, e.g., the Alaska second degree arson statute, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.410 (1978),
which refers only to buildings, whereas the first degree arson statute, id. § 11.46.400, and the
statute covering criminally negligent burnings, id. § 11.46.430, refer to burning of any
property. See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-5-4(9) (Burns 1979).
192. See, e.g., S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 (Supp. 1978).
193. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 13A-7-40 (1978) which defines building as "any
structure which may be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging, or
the storage of goods, and includes any vehicle, railway car, aircraft or watercraft used for the
lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein." Id.
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West 1976).
195. DEL. CODE. tit. 11, §§ 801-03 (1975).
196. Asiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1703, -1704 (1978). Section 13-1703 covers the arson of unoccu-
pied property, and § 13-1704, that of occupied structures.
197. S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 22-23-1 applies to occupied structures, with the further
requirement that the arsonist know them to be occupied. Section 22-33-3 pertains to burning
of unoccupied structures.
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grade offenses according to whether the building burned was occu-
pied. '9 The New Mexico statute, 9' on the other hand, categorizes
the types of property subject to arson ranging from occupied build-
ings to fences.2 0
Some codes still list arson to defraud as a separate provision2"'
while the New Mexico statute includes it iwthin its general section2 12
providing distinctions according to the value of property affected. 03
Many states make no specific provision for arson fraud; in these
cases arson fraud is either implied204 or found in other sections of the
penal code such as a theft-by-deception provision.205
The New York statute °20  serves as the model upon which some
statutes are based.2 7 The article covering arson is comprised of four
degrees of offense 0 which are based on danger to persons0" and the
198. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.51 (West 1974).
199. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-17-5 (1972).
200. Id. The statute reads, in pertinent part, "any building, occupied structure or prop-
erty of another, or bridge, utility line, fence or sign .. " Id. See also DEL. CODE tit. 7, §
3101 (1975), which proscribes burning of forested land.
201. See note 190 supra.
202. See note 199 supra.
203. Id. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-17-5(1) to -5(3) (1972), which grades the degree
of offense committed according to the value of the property destroyed. For example, if the
property is valued at $100 or less, the crime of arson against it is a misdemeanor, whereas if
the value is in excess of $1,000, the classification is a third degree felony. Id.
204. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1979), which divides property offenses
into Arson and Criminal Mischief, but makes no mention of arson to defraud. See also IOWA
CODE ANN. § 712.1 (West 1978) where the statute, in defining arson, deals with arson fraud
in a negative sense: it is not arson "where no insurer has been exposed fraudulently to any
risk." Id.
205.. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A; § 13A-7-42 (1978). The Commentary to this section
states:
Under 13A-7-42 intentionally setting fire to one's own building still amounts to arson
if the motivation is not lawful and proper. . . .Submission of a claim to an insurance
company under circumstances in which no payment would be made if the truth were
known is attempted theft by deception, and actual receipt of money under the policy
is theft by deception.
Id., Commentary at 140.
206. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.00-.20 (McKinney 1978).
207. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 13A-7-41 (commentary) (1978) which specifically
cites to the New York statute as a source. See also Ex parte Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 49, 187
P.2d 411, 415 (1947) which attributes California's arson statute to the New York formulation.
208. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.05 (McKinney 1978) (arson in the fourth degree); 150.10
(arson in the third degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree); 150.20 (arson in the first
degree).
209. Id. § 150.20. The first degree statute is limited to damage as a result of an explosion
when the individual knew or should have known that the building was occupied.
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intent to damage. 10 The statute applies only to buildings."' Signifi-
cantly, New York makes no specific provision for arson to defraud;
such an offense is presumptively covered by the general proscription
against unlawful burnings.2 12
Finally, the recent Hawaii statute213 represents a unique depar-
ture from any model or actual arson legislation. Eliminating the
"archaic"21 terminology of arson and criminal mischief, the statute
defines all such offenses in four degrees of "criminal property dam-
age." 21 This novel statute, however, maintains distinctions among
the degrees of offense based on the more traditional criteria of dan-
ger to persons, 21 1 intent,2 17 and the value of the property affected. '"
It is evident from the foregoing overview of the development of the
criminal law of arson that arson is a difficult crime to prove. The
fine distinctions which developed from the common law still remain
in many state codifications. Despite the intention of the Model
Penal Code to consolidate these varieties of arson, the apparent
increased incidence of the crime has forced legislatures to create
additional offenses such as aggravated arson. Arson fraud is perhaps
more difficult to prosecute as it requires proof of a more specific
criminal intent: burning with the purpose of defrauding an insur-
ance carrier. Reliance must be placed, of necessity, on otherwise
inadmissible evidence such as motive.
210. Id. § 150.05. This fourth degree offense is, in essence, a reckless endangerment stat-
ute requiring only an intention to start a fire or cause an explosion which results in reckless
damage of the building. On the other hand, arson in the third degree, id. § 150.10, requires
an intent to damage.
211. All of the offenses are defined in terms of destruction to a "building." "Building"
is defined to include "any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of
persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.00
(McKinney 1978).
212. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.10(2)(b) (McKinney 1978). This section provides an affirma-
tive defense, namely, if "the defendant's sole intent was to destroy or damage the building
for a lawful and proper purpose." Id. The Practice Commentary states: "The motive for
arson is most often either insurance or vindictiveness . . . .The [affirmative] defense is
unavailable .. .to a defendant who damages his own building with intent to defraud an
insurer, or for some other unlawful or improper purpose." Id., Commentary at 91.
213. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -822 (1976).
214. Id., Commentary at 379.
215. See note 208 supra.
216. Compare HAw. REV. STAT. § 708-820 (1976) (endangering persons) with id. § 708.
821 (no endangering requirements).
217. Id. § 708-821. But see id. § 708-823 (reckless damage statute).
218. Id. § 708-821 (second degree offense where property damaged exceeds $500); id.
§ 708-822 (third degree offense where property damaged exceeds $50).
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Many of the difficulties inherent in the proof of the crime of arson
are paralleled in civil litigation when an insurance company defends
against a claim on the grounds that the property was destroyed by
incendiarism. This area is the subject of Part IV.
IV. The Arson Case In the Civil Forum
A. Introduction
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, state legislatures
have recognized a need for uniformity among fire insurance con-
tracts.2 19 In 1943 the New York Standard Fire Policy became effec-
tive, and has been adopted in identical or substantially similar form
since then by approximately forty-five states, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico. 220 This Standard Polcy contains the "165
Lines" 2 1 which set forth most of the provisions of the contract. The
parties do, however, retain a right to add conditions not in contrav-
ention of the Standard Policy. The 165 Lines and the endorsements
and forms added thereto define the rights and obligations of the
parties, and are inherently involved in the issue of arson for profit.
)B Measuring Actual Cash Value of the Insured Property
The first page of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy of the State
219. R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER & C.A. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 143-44
(6th ed. 1976). The benefits of such uniformity are identified as, inter alia, judicial determina-
tion of the meaning of important words and phrases as applied against all insureds, and the
reduction of discrepancies between policies covering the same risks. Therefore, loss settlement
is facilitated and the number of lawsuits is reduced. Id. at 144.
220. S.S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 24 (2d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as HUEBNER]. The standard forms have been approved in some
jurisdictions by administrative action of the Insurance Commissioner, and, in the following
states, by statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1503 (1975); CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-98 (West Supp. 1978); 5A HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-420 (1976); 7B
'IDAHO CODE § 41-2401 (1977); 30 IOWA CODE ANN. § 515-138 (West Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-691; (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.160 (Vernon 1968); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-501 (1974); 1947 Nev. Stats. Ch. 266; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407:22 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17:36 5.19, 5.20 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-8-10 (1962); N.Y. INS. LAW § 168
(McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-176 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-03-40 (1978); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4803 (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 743.609-663 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 636 (Purdon 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-5-3 (1978); 1945 S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 133:
6A VA. CODE §§ 38.1-364 to 367 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 33-17-2 (1975); 1945 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 68.
One state to recently move away from standard policy uniformity is Wisconsin. See 1975
Wis. Laws ch. 375, § 8 (effective June 22, 1976).
221. HUEBNER, supra note 220, at 27.
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of New York"2 sets forth the measure of liability of a fire insurer as
"the extent of the actual cash value of the property at the time of
loss. .. ."223 This limit upon recovery is to give effect to "the well-
recognized principle that the contract of fire insurance is intended
to afford merely indemnity for loss .. ."224 Moreover, the limit is
an attempt to curtail the "moral hazard" involved in property in-
surance. 225 If insurance proceeds may be received for more than the
"actual cash value," arson becomes a profitable alternative.
There are three potential tests to determine the "actual cash
value" of insured property: (1) market value, (2) the "broad evi-
dence" rule, and (3) cost of reproduction less depreciation. The
"market value" test sets the "actual cash value" equal to the rea-
sonable market price at the time of the fire. 226 This approach is
almost never used independently, and finds expression most fre-
quently as a single consideration among many under the second
aforementioned test. The invalidity of "market value" is attribut-
able to the legal doctrine that "real property is unique." If it is
unique, it does not have any objective market value. The market
value of a building is so necessarily tied to the value of the property
upon which it was built that the building can not be said to have
an independent value. The test is occasionally used as a conceptual
aid in the jury instructions. As such, the "test" is what a theoretical
buyer and seller would have agreed upon as a price for the insured
property, following fair negotiations, at the point in time just before
the fire.22 This is really only an additional, intermediary step, be-
222. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6) (McKinney 1966).
223. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1966). This is subject to the following limitations:
not exceeding the amount which it would cost to repair or replace the property with
material of like kind and quality within a reasonable time after such loss without
allowance for any increased cost of repair or reconstruction by reason of any ordinance
or law regulating construction or repair, and without compensation for loss resulting
from interruption of business or manufacture, nor in any event for more than the
interest of the insured.
Id.
224. W. VANCE, INSURANCE § 154 (3d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as VANCE].
225. See Note, Valuation and Measure of Recovery Under Fire Insurance Policies, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 818, 822 (1949). See also pt IV(D)(4) infra.
226. Annot., Insurance § 1637, 44 AM. JuR. 2d (1969) [hereinafter cited as Insurance
Annotation]. It is noted that this test is usually applied only, if at all, to the valuation of
personal property. Id.
227. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934); Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 64 N.D.
764, 772, 256 N.W. 214, 219 (1934).
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cause to determine the price in this hypothetical sale, the trier of
fact will turn to the second "test.
28
This second test, commonly known as the "broad evidence" rule,
is most often attributed to the landmark case of McAnarney v.
Newark Fire Insurance Co. n5 The court stated that:
230
[w]here insured buildings have been destroyed, the trier of fact may, and
should, call'to its aid, in order to effectuate complete indemnity, every fact
and circumstance which would logically tend to the formation of a correct
estimate of the loss. It may consider original cost and cost of reproduction;
the opinions upon value given by qualified witnesses; the declarations against
interest which may have been made by the assured; the gainful uses to which
the buildings might have been put; as well as any other fact reasonably
tending to throw light upon the subject.
The drawback of this rule, accepted in the'vast majority of jurisdic-
tions, is that no firm figure as to the value of the property, for
insurance purposes, is readily available. This lack of certainty may
result in slight violations of the public policy against over or under
insuring property, as the insured and insurance agent or broker will
probably fail to take into account every relevant consideration. An
additional potential danger is the degree of flexibility built into this
test, which may allow juries a greater exercise of emotion.2I The
obvious benefit, however, is a more equitable distribution of insur-
ance proceeds, and the furtherance of the public policy favoring
indemnity. As "value" is largely a matter of opinion, rigid tests to
228. See Insurance Annotation, supra note 226, § 1639 (1969). Nevertheless, the "market
value" test is given an independent meaning in a few jurisdictions. Courts in California and
Maine have flatly declared that "actual cash value" in an insurance policy is synonymous
with "fair market value." Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 475 P.2d
880, 90 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970); Forer v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 295 A.2d 247 (Me. 1972).
Indiana probably follows the same rule. See Atlas Construction Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 160
Ind. App. 33, 309 N.E.2d 810 (1974). What the standards are for setting that market price is,
of course, unclear. One commentator has suggested that the "tests" for actual cash value are
"battered" about, chosen and discarded, with the true intention of most accurately applying
the principle of indemnity to the circumstances at hand. Hinkle, The Meaning of "Actual
Cash Value," 539 INs. L.J. 711, 723 (1967). Another commentator has advocated a greater
uniformity among these standards. To this end, defining the phrase legislatively is seen as
the "only sensible approach." Cozen, Measure and Proof of Loss Alternatives, 12 THE FORUM
647, 659 (1977). In the jurisdictions where "fair market value" is the standard, some clarifica-
tion is needed. The method of determining "fair market price" must be distinguished, if
possible, from the "broad evidence rule."
229. 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928). See also Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1149 (1928).
230. 247 N.Y. at 184, 159 N.E. at 905.
231. This danger is partially offset, of course, by the availability of appellate review.
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determine value may do more damage than good under almost any
form of evaluation. 2
The third test to determine "actual cash value" is the cost of
reproduction less depreciation.23 This is the method of valuation
which provides for the greatest degree of certainty. It is also the
method that paves the way most accomodatingly for the arsonist's
economic gain. Where market value is virtually nothing, there can
always be a reproduction cost which will, at least to a small degree,
exceed depreciation. The variance between the proceeds and the
"true value" is often seen as a prime inducement to arson.2" Never-
theless, two jurisdictions maintain this test: Pennsylvaniam and
Illinois.231
Left alone, this standard can work great inequities.23? In Illinois,
the courts dealt with this issue in 192021 and have not done so
since. The growing alarm at the increase of incendiarism has caused
a certain dissatisfaction with this test's results. In 1975 the
Seventh Circuit was called upon to interpret Illinois law on this
point in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.219 The court developed a rule which, without overrul-
ing the "reproduction cost less depreciation" standard, manages to
infuse some of the principles of equitable indemnification into the
law.
The facts from the Chicago Title & Trust Co. case present a
classic example of the process of urban decay which frequently ends
in arson for profit. In 1966 the building in question was put into a
land trust. In 1970 the mortgagee began the process of foreclosing
232. As one court has maintained: "Value is a matter of opinion. The adoption of an
invariable test of value would only serve to shackle sound opinion in a situation where other
factors may overcome or qualify its influence. This cannot be done in the name of speedy
and simple administration." Messing v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77 N.J. Super. 531, 534, 187 A.2d
49, 51 (1962).
233. Insurance Annotation, supra note 226, § 1638. See also Cozen, Measure and Proof of
Loss Alternatives, 12 THE FORUM 647, 651-55.
234. Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires, 12 THE FORUM 827, 835 (1977).
235. Farber v. Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 480, 88 A.2d 776 (1952); Fedas v. Insur-
ance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 151 A. 285 (1930).
236. Smith v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920); but see Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 511 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1975).
237. This is especially true when the essential component of "depreciation" is left unde-
fined. See Cozen, Measure and Proof of Loss Alternatives, 12 THE FORUM 647, 653.
238. 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920).
239. 511 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1975).
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the mortgage, while the city had instituted a suit based on Muni-
cipal Building Code violations. The city sought, inter alia, the dem-
olition of the building. A receiver was appointed in the meantime
to provide heat for the building, but subsequently this plan was
dropped without any repairs having been made.4 0 In 1971, benefi-
cial interest in the land trust was sold to Alex Salb for $7,000. He
thereupon procured, under the FAIR plan, 24' fire insurance in the
amount of $50,000. Less than six months later, the building was
damaged by fire. Alex Salb collected $18,556 for this loss. None of
this money was spent on repairs. One can imagine the physical
condition of the building in early 1972.
A few weeks after the fire, thie Building Inspector found this build-
ing to be "vacant and open," and "in a dangerous and hazardous
conditiom '"243 Alex Salb was ordered to "board and secure" the
premises. Instead, he sold his beneficial interest to Oddie Banks
Wright. Although the "agreed-upon price" was allegedly $4,400, no
more than $400 was actually paid.2 4 Ms. Wright, thereafter, was
ordered to board and secure the premises. Instead, she allegedly
made $7,000 worth of repairs, although there was no corroborating
evidence-invoices, receipts, or testimony-of any repairs at all. A
few weeks after the court's order to Ms. Wright, the building was
again damaged by fire. Ms. Wright sought a recovery of $43,795 for
her losses.2"
The district judge had noted two complete defenses potentially
available to the defendant: "vacancy, ' 24 6 and "increase of haz-
ard. 2 These defenses were mooted, however, by the fact that "the
building was economically useless at the time of the fire, '248 thus
defeating the insured's right to recover. This interesting hybrid of
240. Id. at 242.
241. "FAIR" is acronymic for "Fair Access to Insurance Requirements." For a full dis-
cussion of these plans, see Comment, FAIR Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-
Profit Hazard, 7 FORDHAM Urn. L.J. 617 (1979).
242. 511 F.2d at 243.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. N.Y. INs. LAW § 168(6), lines 33-35 (McKinney 1966). See pt. IV(D)(5) infra.
247. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6), lines 31-32 (McKinney 1966). See pt. IV(D)(4) infra.
248. • 376 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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all three "actual cash value" tests249 was subsequently modified by
the court of appeals.
The Seventh Circuit recognized its duty to observe Illinois' "cost
of reproduction less depreciation" rule, but decided to correlate the
award to the "insurable interest."2  This was not an entirely novel
idea, even in Illinois courts. In Lieberman v. Hartford Insurance
Co., "I the court had denied recovery for a building destroyed by fire,
where a contract for the demolition of the building had been entered
into prior to the date of the fire. Under such facts, it was held that
the insured had no insurable interest because the building was
wholly without economic value. 52 The court of appeals in Chicago
Title & Trust Co. reasoned, on the basis of Lieberman, that Illinois
249. Perhaps a more accurate description of the district court result is that the principle
of "insurable interest" was given a broad interpretation. Insurable interest in property is
frequently said to exist where the insured "would profit by or gain some advantage by its
continued existence and suffer some loss or disadvantage by its destruction." 3 COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2d § 24:13 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as COUCH]. An insurable interest is
invariably required under the standard fire policies. See note 220 supra. Although pecuniary
interest is a prime consideration, "insurable interest" is not often said to depend on the
"economic usefulness" of the property.
250. This concept has been limited very sharply in other jurisdictions. For example, the
highest court in Maine decided that "the mere existence of an executory contract for demoli-
tion does not destroy the value of the building or deprive the owner of an insurable interest."
Gendron v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 384 A.2d 694, 697 (Me. 1978). There is one redeeming
feature here, however, such that arsonists may not put demolition companies out of business.
Maine follows the "fair market value" test for "actual cash value," which is to be determined
at the time of the fire. This being the case, the executory contract for demolition would be
seen as having a dampening effect on the price a willing seller could receive.
An even more destructive result was reached in Bailey v. Gulf Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 47 (10th
Cir. 1969). There, an Oklahoman fraternity house was declared a nuisance (presumably
pursuant to the municipal building code), and the owner was ordered to demolish and remove
the structure. The merits of this order were not contested. But before demolition, the building
burned down. The court held that the order to demolish "has no bearing upon [thej value
for fire insurance purposes." Id at 49. In essence, the court entirely removed the concept of
"insurable interest" by saying that the insurer is liable for "the real value of the building as
such, not its relative value to the insured." Id. Despite how much this sounds like a
"reproduction less depreciation" standard, Oklahoma officially follows the "broad evidence"
test for determining "actual cash value." Nonetheless, the court of appeals decided that
"proof that future events might prove the fire to have been of benefit to the insured" was
inadmissable. Id. This incredible conclusion served to result in a minimum award of $7,000.
Id. This figure served to reimburse the insured for the "loss" of certain demolition expenses.
Fortunately, courts have been willing to say, at least, that when a building is in the process
of being torn down, it has no "actual cash value" as a matter of law. Aetna State Bank v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 345 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (emphasis added).
251. 6 Ill. App. 3d 948, 287 N.E.2d 38 (1972).
252. See note 249 supra.
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courts prefer recoveries at least roughly to correspond to the amount
of damage done. This conclusion was bolstered by three public pol-
icy considerations of the "insurable interest" requirement:5 3 (1) the
policy against "wagering;" (2) the policy against rewarding and
thereby tempting the destruction of property; and (3) the policy of
confining insurance contracts to indemnity. The court found that
these policies would be violated where there was an award of dam-
ages representing a "gross disparity" from the "value of the building
measured on any rational basis, such as market value, economic
utility, or utility for a special purpose of the owner."' 25' The majority
opinion clearly implies that, at least in certain circumstances, the
"reproduction cost less depreciation" test is somewhat less than
"drational."2"
In Lieberman, the "insurable interest" concept worked as a com-
plete bar, vel non, to recovery. However, the court extended that
principle in Chicago Title & Trust such that damages will be limited
to the extent of the interest. The "insurable interest" therefore is
coextensive with the insured's investment.25 The court was con-
cerned that perhaps the purchase price, and the $7,000 for repairs
had, in fact, been paid, and that unless the building "is irrevocably
committed to demolition or is abandoned subsequent to the making
of the expenditures," the insured should be entitled to recover. 257 On
this ground, the court remanded for a new trial.25
There was a further twist to this case, based on the existence of a
"coinsurance clause."1 The clause operated in this instance to re-
253. These principles are discussed in a renowned law review article, which is cited almost
invariably when the topic of 'insurable interest" arises. See Harnett & Thornton, Insurable
Interest in Property: A Socio-economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 43 COLUM. L. REv.
1162, 1178-83 (1948).
254. 511 F.2d at 247.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 248. The court of appeals did not consider the two defenses made by the
insurance company-vacancy and increase of hazard-which, if successful, would act as a
complete bar to recovery. Presumably, these defenses would be available to the insurance
company at the new trial. The court did say -that if the building were "not irrevocably
committed to demolition or abandoned" (i.e., vacant), the insured would recover to the extent
of her investment. Id. at 248. By including only the "vacancy" defense, the court surely did
not intend thereby to exclude the "increase of hazard" defense. No court would have held
that the neglect of a building, along with the failure to comply with court orders to "board
and secure," could never "increase the hazard," as a matter of law.
259. "Coinsurance has the effect of preventing one who is insured for a small part of actual
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duce recovery "in proportion to the amount by which coverage is
less than a given percentage, here 80 percent, of the 'actual cash
value' of the property. "260 In such a case as this, the insured is faced
with a dilemma. Since the Illinois law for determining "actual cash
value" is formally "reproduction cost less depreciation," this stan-
dard will presumably be used for establishing the degree of insur-
ance coverage. If the "insurable interest" concept is to define the
"actual cash value" at trial, and this figure is below the value ar-
rived at earlier, the insured will have been subjected to artificially
high premiums. If, however, premiums are paid on the basis of the
"insurable interest," the insured's recovery for the loss will be re-
duced by the effect of the coinsurance clause. The court admitted
that there was no equitable solution possible for this problem, not-
ing that "[d]evelopment of the law often causes some temporary
dislocations.""' It was further observed that if the Illinois courts
were forced by the law of "actual cash value" to choose between
grossly disproportionate recoveries and excessive premiums for
buildings with questionable value, it would prefer to allow the lat-
ter.262
The "reproduction cost less depreciation." method of determining
"actual cash value" is used to "prevent inequities that may result
when there is a disparity between the market value of the real prop-
erty destroyed and the value of the property to the insured, who in
fairness should be put in substantially the same position he was in
before the fire. 2 3 It also, however, frequently results in the "gross
disparities" feared by the court in Chicago Title & Trust Co. The
"fair market value" test is attractive for its simplicity, but there is
a major drawback. If the market value is accurately determined, it
value, and who has paid a correspondingly small premium, from collecting as much, in the
event of loss, as one who is insured for a large percentage of value and who has paid a
correspondingly large premium." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 Misc.
846, 55 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1945), affl'd, 274 A.D. 1045, 86 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 506,
93 N.E.2d 73 (1950). These clauses are included because the vast majority of losses by fire
are to a relatively small percentage of the total property insured. This is true now more than
ever, given sophisticated fire prevention systems. In virtually all jurisdictions these clauses
have been held to be valid. There are a few exceptions, where they are statutorily limited.
See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 566 (1972).
260. 511 F.2d at 247.
261. Id.
262. id. at 248.
263. Id. at 245. See also 6 Cooizy, Bmsis ON THE LAw OF INsURAN E §§ 5089; 5090 (2d
ed. 1927).
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involves, essentially, a "broad evidence" concept. If great weight is
given to the actual recent purchase price, as frequently is the case,
the jury could easily be misled by sophisticated techniques giving
the appearance of an "arm's length" transaction, when one in fact
does not exist.2"' Potentially serious inequities can be avoided by the
more cumbersome, but finally more satisfactory "broad evidence"
method of determining "actual cash value." In light of the height-
ened national awareness of the problem of arson, this standard
should be reconsidered in the jurisdictions which have chosen to
employ one of the other methods.
C. Arson Cases and the Standard of Proof
An insurance company faced with a claim on a fire insurance
policy can defend in many ways. Two primary methods are the
affirmative defense of arson for which the plaintiff is responsible,
and misrepresentation in the proof of loss." 5 The allegations neces-
sary to these defenses establish the essential elements of the crimes
of arson and intent to defraud. Yet, in the context of a civil suit to
collect insurance proceeds the burden of persuasion"' to be met is
not the constitutionally required standard for criminal cases"' of
"beyond a reasonable doubt,2 68 as might be expected.
264. One example is "a collateral agreement to satisfy the bond and mortgage for a
fraction of face value if paid within a fixed period after the transaction." See James J. Taylor,
Updated Guidelines for Defending Arson for Profit Claims, Address before the Comm. on
Prop. Ins. Law, A.B.A. Annual Meeting in New York City 6 (Aug. 9, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Taylor Address]. Also, an "agreed-upon purchase price" might well be fictitious, with no
intention of either party that it ever be paid.
265. For a discussion of the common law arson defense, see pt. IV(D)(1) infra. For a
discussion of the misrepresentation defense, see pt. IV(D)(2) infra.
266. The term "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings. Primarily, it refers to the
burden of producing evidence, to the judge's satisfaction, which is relevant to proving a fact
in issue. Secondly, the "burden of proof" describes a standard, above which the evidence
must rise, such that the trier of fact will decide in favor of the party producing that evidence.
See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. This
second meaning is often referred to as the "burden of persuasion," or the "risk of non-
persuasion." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
"Burden of proof"' or "burden of persuasion" will, in this section, refer to the "risk of non-
persuasion." This aspect of the law of evidence finds expression most frequently in the
language used in jury instructions, and as a legal standard providing a subject for appellate
review.
267. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
268. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 266, § 2498 n.3 and accompanying text. See Sundquist v.
Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 371 Ill. 360, 21 N.E.2d 297 (1939). Illinois, in the Sundquist
case, was perhaps the last state to overrule the old principle that facts constituting a crime
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There is great variety of opinion regarding the appropriate stan-
dard of proof applicable to an insurance company's defense of arson
or misrepresentation of a material fact. Traditionally, where a fraud
is alleged, proof must be made by "clear and convincing evi-
dence." ' Occasionally, legally equivalent phrases are employed,
such as "clear, precise, and indubitable." ' 10 To establish a cause of
action or defense in most other civil suits2' requires only proof "by
a preponderance of the evidence," 2 or as it is frequently stated, "by
the greater weight of the credible evidence. ' ' 3 The necessary first
question is whether there is any difference between the two stan-
dards, as applied by the trier of fact.
There is broad agreement that "clear and convincing" proof re-
quires more or better evidence presented to persuade a trier of fact
than simple "preponderance of the evidence." McCormick, citing
Professor McBaine,274 argues that "clear, strong, and convincing"
proof demands that a trier find the fact "highly probably true,"
whereas "by a preponderance of the evidence" simply necessitates
that a fact be "probably true." If "highly" is to have import, then
the standards, as described, differ. Most courts have taken this for
granted.
However, some recent Tenth Circuit, arson-related cases have
questioned this venerable assumption that the two standards differ.
In Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Fox, "I the court was faced with
jury instructions requiring, erroneously, proof by "clear and con-
must be proved, even in a civil suit, by the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at
363, 21 N.E.2d at 299. When this rule was in force, there were certain severe criminal conse-
quences of civil liability where a crime was alleged. The Sundquist court mentions that
prosecution might follow, without the intervention of a grand jury. Id. at 365, 21 N.E.2d at
299. The threat of loss of life or liberty as the consequence of a civil action, however, no longer
exists.
269. MCCORMICK, supra note 266, § 340 n.74 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Ratay v. Lincoln Nat'l Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 209, 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 973 (1967). Other examples include "clear, convincing and satisfactory," "clear,
cogent and convincing," and "clear, unequivocal, satisfactory and convincing." McCoRMICK,
supra note 266, § 340 nn.67-69 and accompanying text.
271. "Fraud" is not the only cause of action or defense which must be proved by "clear
and convincing evidence." Others have included: suits on oral contracts to make a will, or to
establish the terms of a lost will; suits for the specific performance of an oral contract;
reformation or modification of written transactions. Id. at nn.76-79 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at § 339.
273. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Eagle Fire Co. of N.Y., 325 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1963).
274. McCORMICK, supra note 266, § 339 n.47.
275. 361 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1966).
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vincing evidence." ' The error was found harmless. As justification,
the court reasoned that "[tihe words clear and convincing or clear
and satisfactory are often used as the standard of proof in such an
instruction and can hardly be considered a larger burden than pre-
ponderance of the evidence." 2"1
This astounding revelation was met with resounding silence, Per-
haps the statement is appropriate only to the confusing issue of the
"burden of persuasion" in a defense to a fire insurance claim where
incendiarism is involved.ug In 1972 Connecticut Fire Insurance Co.
v. Fox was cited by the Tenth Circuit for the proposition men-
tioned," ' and although not relied upon for the holding, there was no
skepticism expressed with regard to the validity of the argument.
As a District Court in theFirst Circuit speculated, "[iut could
be argued that any fact so established by a fair preponderance of
the evidence appears clearly and convincingly." 21 If this argument
were to be generally adopted, it would resolve many of the "burden
of persuasion" difficulties which currently exist.2"' A more explicit
route was recently advocated by Mr. Justice Boyd of the Florida
Supreme Court: "In the interests of uniformity and speed in our
judicial process, I feel we should adhere in all civil cases to the
standard jury instruction which simply requires that the greater
weight of evidence should control." '
As the "clear, convincing and satisfactory" standard is presently
used, there is a great potential for confusion.2 The adjectives con-
strued individually and collectively are remarkably unenlightening.
"Clear" merely describes the juror's reaction. As a layperson would
understand the word, it asks whether a juror understood the point
in evidence; it does not necessarily require the juror's evaluation of
a fact being more or less likely. The application of "convincing"
depends solely upon the standard used. The work deftly begs the
276. Id. at 6.
277. Id. (footnote omitted).
278. See discussion in pt. IV(C) infra.
279. Boone v. Royal Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1972).
280. Banco De San German, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 344 F. Supp. 496, 506 (D.P.R.
1972).
281. See pt. IV(C) infra.
282. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vanater, 297 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1974) (concurring opinion).
283. For a suggested rewriting of the "fraud" jury instruction on "burden of persuasion,"
see E.M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 84-85 (1956).
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question.'" "Satisfactory" seems to do no more than state the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test.
A further source of confusion is the juror's response elicited by the
standard. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is not a confusing standard
as it describes to the juror what his or her state of mind should be
in order to acquit or convict.ns "Clear and convincing evidence,"
however, like the "preponderance" test, compels an objective evalu-
ation of the quality of the evidence. The jury's objectivity, necessary
to give these standards meaning, is sometimes thought to be impos-
sible.'
It is unclear to what extent the "clear and convincing evidence"
requirement influences triers of fact.n ' It may simply suggest cau-
tion when considering the evidence. The resolute manner in which
the judge frames his instructions on an allegation of fraud may also
impress upon the jurors the law's policy preferences. As at least one
court has construed the instruction,2 it may establish an objective
"quality of the evidence" test for the trier of fact's determination.2
There is certainly a strong body of opinion which opposes the use
of this middle standard, at least in its present phrasing.20 Nonethe-
284. For an excellent discussion of this whole issue, see Note, Evidence: Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt in Civil Cases, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 260, 264 (1974).
285. Id. at 263-64.
286. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 180 (1947).
287. In fact, some writers have suggested that this burden, as a distinct standard of proof,
does not even exist. Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAw & Soc'v REV. 319
(1971). In this empirical study, jurors were asked to quantify the probabilities they personally
required to determine an issue both "beyond a reasonable doubt," and "by a preponderance
of the evidence." The study showed that for a criminal conviction, the average juror was
satisfied with a proof of guilt which was 77 percent reliable, and would find liability under a
"preponderance" instruction at a corresponding figure of 73 percent. Id. at 326-27. A greater
distinction would be expected following careful instruction from the judge. On the other hand,
the authors suggest that the average juror employs this implicit probability methodology
despite the judge's charge. Id. at 329. If this accurately portrays jury deliberation, there is
virtually no territory left for the "clear and convincing" standard, which presumably falls
somewhere between traditional criminal and civil standards of proof.
288. See note 234 supra.
289. Homer v. Flynn, 334 A.2d 194 (Me. 1975).
290. See Note, Homer v. Flynn: A Preponderance of Clear and Convincing Evidence, 28
ME. L. REV. 240 (1976). The case involved a fraud, and the jury was instructed to decide in
favor of the plaintiff if such result were supported by the fair preponderance of the evidence.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held this instruction to be erroneous, although, given
the facts, only harmlessly so. The court said, however, that the jury should have been in-
structed to find for the plaintiff only upon the basis of evidence having "strong capacity to
induce belief." Id. at 200. The court spoke in terms of a "preponderance" of such evidence.
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less, it is included in jury instructions frequently, and it remains a
popular tool for the furtherance of certain policies. The balance of
this Comment will assume, with the vast majority of courts, that the
standard can have a cognizable effect. The desired result is eviden-
tial favoritism for those accused of fraud.
Where the burden of persuasion in a civil case involving arson is
"clear and convincing evidence," the justification for this variance
from the common "preponderance" test is the allegation of fraud.2"'
This is supported by the policy that even in a civil suit, a person is
entitled to the presumption of innocence of acts malum in se. 2 2 One
difficulty is finding a satisfactory definition of "fraud."
Fraud can include virtually any act or omission which, by design,
results in a loss to someone. Even this would be regarded by many
as overly restrictive.2 3 In 1871, Mr. Justice Strong described fraud
as "deceit, with a design to deprive [a person] of some profit or
advantage, and to acquire it for [oneself], whenever loss or damage
has resulted from the deceit."29' In 1946, Mr. Justice Douglas said
that fraud "connotes perjury, falsification, concealment [and] mis-
representation." ' 1 Faced with authorities both unlikely and un-
willing to form a consistent meaning for the word "fraud," only the
unimaginative attorney would fail to identify it in a remotely condu-
cive set of facts.
Id. This unusual standard was further defined: "the jury should be told that ... evidence
will constitute preponderance only if it is clear evidence, convincing evidence and unequivo-
cal evidence." Id. The jury would thereby be delegated two distinct tasks. The first would
require objective appraisal of the quality of the evidence itself. Satisfying this, the jury would
then have the subjective task of determining the preponderance, vel non, of such evidence.
This conceptually difficult, and possibly self-contradictory two-step process is a heavy burden
to drop into the laps of jurors. The likelihood of confusion from the "clear and convincing"
standard is probably only heightened by the attempt to hybridize it with the "preponder-
ance" test.
291. MCCORMICK, supra note 266, § 340 n.74 and accompanying text.
292. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacob Hieb, Inc., 146 F.2d 447,.452 (8th Cir. 1945).
293. "[Tihe fertility of man's invention in designing new schemes of fraud is so great that
courts have always declined to define it, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it in
whatever form it may present itself. It is, indeed, said that it is better not to define the term
lest the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud which might evade such a defini-
tion. (footnotes omitted)." Annot., Fraud and Deceit § 1, 37 AM. JUR. 2d (1968). "[Sjome
courts have said that the common law not only fails to define fraud but perhaps asserts as a
principle that there shall be no definition." Annot., Fraud § 1, 37 C.J.S. (1943) (footnote
omitted).
294. Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 456, 464 (1871).
295. Knauer v, United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946).
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There are two distinct acts which have been classified as "fraud"
which are frequently charged in arson-related cases. First and most
common is the defense of incendiarism: arson for which the insured
is responsible. Second, a material misrepresentation of fact in the
proof of loss is a complete defense to a suit for fire insurance pro-
ceeds. Courts have splintered as to whether one, both, or neither of
these acts are "fraud" so as to invoke the more rigorous standard of
"clear and convincing evidence." A history of arson-related cases in
Illinois, and in the Seventh Circuit applying Illinois law, provides
an excellent example of this potential confusion.
In 1935, consistent with the common law, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that fraud, where there was false swearing in a proof of
loss, required proof by evidence which was "clear and convinc-
ing."2 6 Four years later, Mr. Chief Justice Shawl9 7 initiated the
confusion with his opinion in Sundquist v. Hardware Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. "I The defense asserted in Sundquist was the plaintiff-
insured's alleged "false swearing" in the proof of loss."' But the
court also referred to the defense of "incendiarism" ' 0 upon which
the decision seems to rely. The plaintiff sought an instruction re-
quiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, since the elements of a
crime were alleged. After citing many authorities in favor of chang-
ing the standard of proof in fraud cases,101 the court decided that
"preponderance of the evidence" was the applicable standard. The
rationale was based on the relation between civil and criminal suits,
296. Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N.E. 420 (1935). The court
said that "[tihe presumption very properly is that all men are honest. Where fraud is
charged, it must affirmatively be proved by clear and convincing testimony. It cannot be
established on mere suspicion." Id. at 598, 195 N.E. at 426. They went on, however, to say
that "[flalse swearing in a proof of loss in order to void the insurance policy must be willful
and with intent to deceive and defraud the insurer. (cites omitted)." Id. This, although true,
is confusing, when stated seemingly as part of the burden of persuasion. The United States
Supreme Court had spoken earlier in an oft-cited opinion on this subject. Claflin v. Common-
wealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81 (1884). The Court held that "if the matter were material and
the statement false, to the knowledge of the party making it, and willfully made, the intention
to deceive the insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend
the natural consequences of his acts." Id. at 95. Claflin reflects the current majority position
where a "false swearing" defense has been raised.
297. Mr. Justice Shaw had dissented in the Weininger case on purely jurisdictional
grounds. 359 11. at 600, 195 N.E. at 426.
298. 371 Ill. 360, 21 N.E.2d 297 (1939).
299. Id. at 366, 21 N.E.2d at 300. See discussion in pt. IV(D)(2) infra.
300. 371 Ill. at 361, 21 N.E.2d at 298.
301. Id. at 364, 21 N.E.2d at 299.
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and the loss, vel non, of life or liberty.30J There was no consideration
of the applicability of the traditional fraud standard of "clear and
convincing evidence," nor of the bases used to justify that standard.
The general rule in Illinois, as expressed by the vast majority of
cases, is that fraud must proven by "clear and convincing evi-
dence.''303 By focusing on allegations of "crime" rather than
"fraud," however, the Sundquist case changed this rule as to arson-
related claims in Illinois. Defenses in such cases may be proven only
by a "preponderance of the evidence.""3 ' This variance from the
general rule is questionable, as a more fraudulent practice than
"false swearing" in a proof of loss is difficult to imagine. Further,
because of the lack of precision in Sundquist, the distinctions be-
tween standards of proof of "false swearing" and incendiarism re-
main cloudy.
The rule as to standard of proof in arson-related cases is far from
consistent in jurisdictions other than Illinois. However, there is
usually a more logical distinction recognized between those cases
where the fraud of "false swearing" is alleged, and those where the
defense of "arson" is raised. More often than not, "false swearing"
involves "clear and convincing evidence, 3 5 and the defense of
302. Id. at 365, 21 N.E.2d at 299-300.
303. See Sajich v. Sajich, 128 Ill. App. 2d 432, 262 N.E.2d 11 (1970); Turzynski v. Libert,
122 Ill. App. 2d 352, 259 N.E.2d 295, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1970); Maxwell v. McWil-
liams, 145 Ill. App. 155, 171 (1908); ("clear, satisfactory and persuasive"); Crocker v. Manley,
164 Ill. 282, 296, 45 N.E. 577, 581 (1896) (" 'clear and irrefragable' "); Walker v. Hough, 59
Ill. 375, 380 (1871) ("strongest and most cogent").
But see American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Hall, 110 Ill. App. 463 (1903), aff'd, 208 Il1. 597,
70 N.E. 581 (1904); Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Lyon, 185 Ill. 343, 56 N.E. 1083 (1900); King-
man & Co. v. Reinemer, 166 Ill. 208, 46 N.E. 786 (1897).
304. Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975); L & S Enterprises Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1971); Esquire
Restaurant, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1968); Commerce
Union Bank v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 53 Ill. App. 2d 229, 239, 202 N.E.2d 688, 693 (1964).
Illustrative of the confusion which has resulted from Sundquist, the L & S Enterprises Co.
and Esquire Restaurant, Inc. cases cited Sundquist as authority for applying the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in false swearing cases, and the Honeycutt and
Commerce Union Bank cases cited it as authority for the standard of proof applicable to the
defense of "arson."
The rule favoring the "preponderance" standard of proof has seen infrequent exception.
See, e.g., Jay-Bee Realty Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 320 Ill. App. 310, 319, 50 N.E.2d 973,
979 (1943), which relied upon the rule established in Weininger. See note 296 supra.
305. E.g., Woods v. Ins. Co. of Texas, 146 F. Supp. 82 (D. Alas. 1956); Castoldi v. Hartford
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Conn. Sup. 265, 154 A.2d 247 (1959); Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 67 Ga. App. 184, 19 S.E.2d 822 (1942); cf. Carpenter v. Union Ins.
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"arson" involves merely a "preponderance." 30 Even in courts out-
side Illinois, however, a certain clarity often if found wanting.30
A typical problem arose with the 1967 case of Greenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co., "I which resulted in a creative and satisfactory inter-
pretation of Pennsylvania law in this area by the. Third, Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 In Greenberg, the trial court had lumped
"arson" and "false swearing" into one fraudulent act, and required
"clear and convincing evidence." The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, fighting the trial judge's broadsword with their own, declared
that "the criminal act need only be established by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence. '310 No attempt to differentiate between the
two defenses was made.
There was an unexpected consequence to this holding. In Ratay
v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. 1 a suit involving a life insur-
ance policy, the Third Circuit had ordered a new trial because of an
erroneous instruction as to the standard of proof of fraud. The jury
had, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, denied recovery to a
Soc'y of Canton, Ltd., 284 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1960). In Carpenter, the court expressly charac-
terized incendiarism as an act of fraud, and as such, was to be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 162.
306. E.g., Don Burton, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1978); Miele
v. Boston Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1961); Baltimore-American Ins. Co. v. Pecos
Mercantile Co., 122 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1941); Klayman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 501 P.2d
750 (Colo. App. 1972); Swindle v. Maryland Cas. Co., 251 So. 2d 787 (La. App.), writ denied,
259 La. 885, 253 So. 2d 217 (1971); Quast v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., 267 N.W.2d 493
(Minn. 1978); Raphtis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 86 S.D. 491, 198 N.W.2d 505 (1972).
307. A good example is C-Suzanne Beauty Salon, Ltd. v. Gen. Ins. Co., 574 F.2d 106 (2d
Cir. 1978). The court noted that, in New York, "fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. at 112 n.9. This was in the context of a comment on the trial judge's erroneous
"preponderance" charge to the jury. However, this case involved both defenses of "arson"
and "false swearing." The language in the court of appeals' decision seems to indicate,
although not clearly, that the "preponderance" charge related only to the allegation of arson.
This, conceivably, could have had nothing to do with the "proof of loss fraud" about which
the court of appeals was speaking. In other words, the court of appeals may have underesti-
mated the trial judge's methodology. Although there is no indicaton of this in the opinion,
the trial judge may have, consistently with what seems to be the majority view on the subject,
charged the jury to use the "preponderance" standard to determine the issue of incendiarism,
and the "clear and convincing" standard for the fraudulent claim of loss. The court of appeals
nowhere suggests, along the lines of Carpenter, 284 F.2d at 162, that in New York arson itself
is deemed an act of "fraud" for standard of proof purposes.
308. 427 Pa. 494, 235 A.2d 582 (1967).
309. It was ultimately resolved in Ratay v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 286 (3d
Cir. 1968).
310. 427 Pa. at 496, 235 A.2d at 584.
311. 378 F.2d 209 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967).
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widow under this defense. The new trial was to be determined, if
against the widow, by "clear, precise and indubitable" evidence."
Before the new trial, however, the Greenberg decision was handed
down, and the district court, agreeing that it might require the
original charge to be made again, certified the order in favor of the
insurance company for appeal. The Third Circuit, in light of
Greenberg, drew a very fine line on the meaning of "fraud." A dis-
tinction was seen between the making of a contract, and a claim of
loss under a contract."' Where the fraud of "false swearing" is in-
volved, the validity of the insurance contract itself is not called into
question;'" the policy by its terms vitiates any liability of the in-
surer where a material misrepresentation is made. Only, therefore,
where there is an allegation of fraud in the "making of a contract"
would the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" apply.
Under this rule, the most frequent perpetration of fraud in arson
cases-excessive claims for property lost to fire-would need only be
proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
This is a desirable result. Such a rule would simplify the duty of
charging the jury, since in most cases the burden of persuasion
would be the same for all defenses.315 Moreover, the significance of
the "clear and convincing" standard would be reduced. This in itself
would be provident, due to the glaring imperfections of the stan-
dard, and would be especially desirable for the difficult question of
what constitutes a "fraud," vel non, where the act of arson is sus-
pected.
D. Defenses Available to the Insurer
1. The Common Law Arson Defense
Many methods of properly denying payment to insureds following
fire losses are delineated in the Standard Fire Policy. A legitimate
312. 378 F.2d at 212.
313. 405 F.2d at 289.
314. Traditionally, rescission or cancellation of a contract has required evidence which is
clear and convincing. The issue often arises in cases which involve the parol evidence rule,
and the standard serves as a further support for the integrity of written contracts.
315. Of course, this would not be true in every case. For example, if an insured, in bad
faith and with fraudulent intent, fails to disclose a material fact to the insurer, this can be
used as a defense to payment on the policy. Presumably, in such a case the relevant burden
of persuasion would be "clear and convincing evidence." For such a case, see Sebring v.
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382, 174 N.E. 761 (1931); New York Bowery Ins. Co.
v. New York Fire Ins. Co,, 17 Wend. 359 (N.Y. 1837).
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defense to the claims of insureds which is not included specifically
in the statute is the common law defense of arson. The insurer must
prove that the fire was ignited by, or that its ignition was procured
or encouraged by the insured.3" If this is successfully done, liability
to the insured is completely vitiated.
A typical case involving the arson defense requires a large amount
of circumstantial evidence, 37 and the essential issues are usually
questions of fact. A favorable jury selection, therefore, is often the
greater part of the battle. Arson cases are appealed, if at all, usually
to determine whether or not the jury's decision was "against the
manifest weight of the evidence. ' ' 31 8 A great obstacle to the elimina-
tion of arson for profit is the fact that a successful defense on the
grounds of arson requires a tremendous amount of investigation and
trial preparation.3 19 A great deal of the appropriate subject matter
of the investigation is likely to have burned up.
A clear understanding of the essentials of a prima facie case is
presented by a comparison of two Seventh Circuit cases.2 In L &
S Enterprises Co. v. Great American Insurance Co. 351 the district
court had not allowed the arson defense to go to the jury. Following
a jury verdict for the insured, the decision was affirmed by the court
of appeals. In Gregory's Continental Coiffures & Boutique v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 322 the defense of arson again was
stricken by the district judge.2 3 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
316. For a discussion of the law concerning recovery by a party who was not the actual
arsonist, see pt. IV(E) infra.
317. Such evidence is generally admissable. See Don Burton, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas.
Co., 575 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 1978) and cases cited therein.
318. Lykos v. American Home Assurance Co., 452 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
Another common ground for appeal, however, as is suggested by the discussion in pt. IV(C)
supra, is the validity of the judge's instruction to the jury..
319. There are quite a few helpful articles on the procedures involved. To name a few:
Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires, 12 THE FORUM 827 (1977); Carmick, Investigation of an
Arson Defense, 11 THE FORUM 493 (1976); McGuire, The Defense of Arson in a Suit Under
an Insurance Policy-Discovery and Trial Preparation, 11 THE FORUM 507 (1976); Karp,
Preparation for the Trial of an Arson Case, 11 THE FORUM 514 (1976); Holloway, Defense of
Arson and Fraud Claims, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 72 (1972).
320. These two cases, decided approximately four and one half years apart, feature two
judges in common, and the same attorney for the plaintiff-insureds. Both cases were appealed
to the Seventh Circuit from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
321. 454 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1971).
322. 536 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1976).
323. Id. at 1188. In this case, the insurer also interposed a defense of fraud in the "proof
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vacated the judgment of the district court, and remanded for a new
trial with the arson defense to go to the jury. The similarities and
differences between the facts presented in each case are enlighten-
ing. There are always many explanations available to justify differ-
ing results from similar fact patterns. Nevertheless, the importance
of certain items of evidence may readily be seen. These items are
those typically of importance in all arson defenses.
. In L & S Enterprises the evidence to prove that the fire was
intentionally set was the weak link. Potentially damaging evidence
of charring patterns, "streamers" of flame,32' and the odor of fuel
was offered. A fireman determined that the cause of the fire was
"suspicious. ' srs However, the Bureau of Fire Investigation dropped
its investigation and an official noted that the fire was possibly
innocent. Both plaintiffs had alibis for the time of the fire's origin.
An "alibi" was irrelevant in the Gregory's case. The plaintiff, in
fact, was out of the country at the time of the fire. But the plaintiff
was directly linked to the purchase of plastic drums, found after the
fire on the premises, which had contained the gasoline used to accel-
erate the fire.
In addition to the incendiary origin of the fire and the plaintiff's
connection thereto, an essential consideration in almost any arson
case is the financial condition of the insured. Such information will
frequently provide proof of motive for the arson.3 16 In L & S
Enterprises, the company had been losing money since its inception.
The market for the services proffered (slot car racing) was also in a
state of decline. There was no question but that a financial gain
would be realized by virtue of a fire. Mitigating these circumstan-
ces, however, was the testimony that the plaintiffs had other in-
come, and regarded the burnt-out company as a "hobby. ' 32 7 In
Gregory's the financial outlook was equally bleak. The court there
seemed to stress the extensive debts the plaintiff company had ac-
cumulated.
of loss." This defense was also withdrawn from the jury by the district judge, and the Seventh
Circuit vacated this decision on appeal. Id. at 1192.
324. 454 F.2d at 458. "Streamers," also known as "trailers," are paths across the floor of
a building which have been doused with some kind of accelerant, in order to spread a fire
from its point of ignition to other areas of the premises. For a discussion of this and similar
topics, see Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires, 12 THE FORUM 827, 828-32 (1977).
325. 454 F.2d at 458.
326. But see note 328 infra.
327. 454 F.2d at 458.
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In a remarkably high percentage of cases, the arsonist failed to
create the appearance of a breaking-and-entering, thereby leaving
damaging evidence of fully secured premises at the time the fire
began. At that point, access to the premises becomes highly rele-
vant. In both L & S Enterprises and Gregory's the doors and win-
dows were apparently locked, and no evidence of forcible entry was
offered. In each case possession of the keys was considered along
with potential motive. This limited access weighed heavily against
the plaintiff in Gregory's, even though he was clearly nowhere near
the scene of the conflagration.
These three factors are the essential elements of the defense of
arson .3 1 In these particular circumstances, the different result prob-
ably could be attributed to the slightly closer connection made be-
tween the plaintiff and the instrumentalities of the incendiarism.
This direct evidential link between the alleged arsonist and the
accelerant is not absolutely necessary, nor even isthe "opportunity"
to arrange for the fire a required element of the defense.2 ' For each
case there is a slightly different pattern of evidence to be empha-
sized with the three major elements in mind. A great deal of circum-
stantial evidence, otherwise of considerably low relevance, is admis-
sible. Judges are usually aware of the fact-as is oft-quoted-that
"[tjhe chance that there will be a motion picture of the arsonist
in the act of setting the dynamite is most unlikely. '"33
2. The "Fraud or False Swearing" Defense
There is an array of technical defenses available to the insurer
which, unlike the "arson" defense, have been written-into the Stan-
dard Fire Policy. Assertion of one of these defenses serves to com-
328. The three elements are summarized as follows: "(a) that the fire was intentionally
set, (b) that the insured had the opportunity to set the fire or have it set, and (c) that the
insured had a motive for doing so." Karp, Preparation for the Trial of an Arson Case, 11 THE
FORUM 514, 514 (1976). See also Boone v. Royal Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1972).
"Motive" is less and less restricted to a determination of financial hardship. The deterioration
of urban areas has created a climate for profit from arson which occurs to people not necessar-
ily themselves in dire financial straits. The purchase price actually paid for certain buildings
can frequently be arranged at a significantly reduced amount from what the insurance policy
will pay. Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 5.6.
329. Elgi Holding, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 511 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1975). There,
following a jury verdict for the insurance company, the court said that the evidence at trial
"which established that the fire was incendiary in nature and that [the insured] had a
motive to cause it" was sufficient to uphold the verdict. Id. at 959.
330. Boone v. Royal Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1972).
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pletely vitiate liability to the insured. The first to appear in the 165
Lines is, broadly, the "fraud or false swearing" defense. It provides
that,3 1
[t]his entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured
has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating
thereto.
This provision presents the insurance company with a good alterna-
tive means of defeating an arsonist's claim, particularly when the
fire itself was cleverly and successfully perpetrated. Theoretically,
any purposefully fraudulent statement, regardless of how. minor,
will entirely vitiate liability on the contract. 32 The fraud or false
swearing can even be committed recklessly to effect the same re-
sult.333 It is unnecessary that the swearing be under oath. 34 As this
harsh rule is intended as a deterrent to those who seek to defraud
insurance companies, an unsuccessful attempt to commit such
fraud will also void the policy. 3 1
This provision, despite its unquestioned validity, offends some
weighty characteristics of the common law. Forfeitures are
abhorred. Public policy favors the insured. Most of all, the law
presumes that all persons are honest.33 Given all of these maxims,
an innocent representation which is inaccurate will not be allowed
to void the policy.3 7 Courts are frequently found to presume the
legal version of two possible, contrary interpretations of the facts.
There is great receptivity to various and innovative means of ex-
331. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6), lines 1-7 (McKinney 1966).
332. Such would seem a logical conclusion from the phrasing of the Standard Policy.
There, willful concealments and misrepresentations are differentiated from "fraud or false
swearing," and the requirement of materiality is applied only to the former. This subtlety is
not frequently observed in the cases, and "materiality" has become an essential element of
the defense generally. Rather than distinguishing between them, concealments and misrepre-
sentations are usually simply labelled a form of fraud or false swearing. See 5A APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 3587 nn.81 & 82 (1970) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN].
333. Smith v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 F. Supp. 675, 682 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd
in part and rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Trice v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 334
F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1963).
334. American Diver's Supply & Mfg. Corp. v. Boltz, 482 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir. 1973);
Mercantile Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 1967).
335. 376 F.2d at 505.
336. Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 N.E. 420, 426 (1935).
337. 5A APPLEMAN, supra note 332, § 3583.
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plaining at trial the reason that a proof of loss was erroneously
compiled. On the other hand, proof of "intent" is virtually always
difficult, and these suits are decided in a civil context, with no
threat of loss of life or liberty involved. Therefore, it was established
in the landmark case of Claflin v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. 338
that, if a material matter were involved, and the statement in the
proof of loss were known by the insured to be false, then the intent
to deceive would be "necessarily implied. ' 331 The Supreme Court
announced that in such circumstances "the law presumes every
man to intend the natural consequences of his act. '3 4 0 This leaves
the insured had manifested as true was actually false; this falsity
involved a "material" issue; and the insured knew that it was not
true, or was so ignorant of its truth or falsity that reasonable efforts
to discover the truth should have been, but were not made3 '
The central issue is where "innocent mistake" ends and "fraud"
begins. Properly, this is a question for the trier of fact. However,
beyond some point of variance between what has been claimed and
what has been proved, "fraud" has occurred as a matter of law, and
liability to the insured-defrauder no longer exists. 42 One court has
phrased it as the boundary line between good and bad faith on the
part of the insured, 3 3 but this does little more than restate the
question.
To consider the actual percentage difference in the claim of loss
from that proved at trial is helpful when the case is at one of the
extremes. It has been noted that when the variance is above 1,000
338. 110 U.S. 81 (1884).
339. Id. at 95.
340. Id.
341. This will vary among jurisdictions. In Michigan there is a fourth requirement that
the misrepresentation be made "with the intention that the insurer would act upon it." West
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Mich. App. 279, 282, 234 N.W.2d 485, 487 (1975) (pursuant
to statute), rev'd on other grounds, 402 Mich. 67, 259 N.W.2d 556 (1977). See also NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-358, specifying that insurance policies may only be voided if, inter alia, "such
breach shall . . . contribute to the loss."
For a survey of the law regarding overvaluation in the proof of loss, see 16 A.L.R.3d 774
(1967).
342. Tenore v. Am. and Foreign Ins. Co. of N.Y., 256 F.2d 791 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958). The court cited COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANcE 5864 (2d ed.
1927): "there is a point where the question of fraud or false swearing becomes one of law, and
beyond which the insured cannot be heard to say that his intent was innocent." 256 F.2d at
793.
343. Yates v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 417 F.2d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 1969).
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percent, fraud as a matter of law is almost always found; when the
variance is less than 100 percent, it is usually presumed to be an
innocent mistake.3" For the majority of cases, however, very little
reliance should be placed on the percentages alone .3  A good exam-
ple of how courts will vary is presented by Morgan v. Badger Mutual
Insurance Co. 311 The insured filed a claim of loss in the amount of
$95,000, and the jury returned a verdict for him in the amount of
$33,000 .31 The district court held that for a businessman to swear
that each item has been counted and valued, and then to deny the
existence of fraud in light of the jury's conclusion, "defies credul-
ity." 38 The court concluded that the existence of fraud "is clearly
the only logical inference that can be drawn. 343 The case was re-
versed, and remanded for a new trial. At the new trial the jury
returned with a verdict for $35,400 plus a response to a specific
interrogatory to the effect that they believed the insured to be inno-
cent of any fraud.3" The trial judge accepted the jury's findings, 3 '
and the case was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
Some courts have devised their own terminology for this distinc-
tion. "Gross overvaluation" has been used." 3 Similarly, another
344. 16 A.L.R.3d 781 (1967). E.g., Newman v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 386,
154 P.2d 451 (1944), wherein the insured claimed losses of $4,000 to his house and $8,000 to
the contents thereof, and reliable evidence was presented at trial that the actual losses
respectively were $750 and $200. The appellate court decided that "an inference of intentional
falsity was more reasonably consistent with the facts that an inference of good faith." Id. at
399, 154 P.2d at 458. At the other extreme is Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Amyx, 262 F.2d 898 (10th
Cir. 1958). In this case the insured reported her loss at approximately $30,000. The jury found
the reasonable value of the property destroyed to be $15,231. The court affirmed the jury's
finding for the insured on the question of "good faith and honest belief' as to the value of
the property burned. Id. at 901. See also cases cited in Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d §§ 17[bJ, 20, at
774 (1967).
345. It is true, however, that, theoretically, "[overvaluation raises a presumption of
fraud in proportion to the excess." Stebane Nash Co. v. Campbellsport Mut. Ins. Co., 27 Wis.
2d 112, 124, 133 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1965). The point is that other factors are involved as well.
346. 181 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Fla. 1960), rev'd and remanded, 192 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Fla.
1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1963).
347. 181 F. Supp. at 499.
348. Id. at 500.
349. Id.
350. 313 F.2d at 784-85.
351. Id. at 785. Contributing to the natural suspicion that the determination of fraud as
a matter of law is an arbitrary process is the fact that the trial judge on remand was the same
one as in the original trial.
352. Id. at 788.
353. Gregory's Continental Coiffures & Boutique v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 536
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court suggested that the presumption of fraud was made conclusive
when the amount claimed and the amount proved are "grossly dis-
parate, and the explanation tendered is so unreasonable or fantastic
that it is inescapable that fraud has occurred. 354
The most reliable method of proving "fraud or false swearing" is
probably to highlight a qualitatively distinct mistake in the proof
of loss, which could have been due to a fraudulent intent. Unless the
claim is excessive, a quantitative variance in dollar amount alone
is usually insufficient. In Tenore v. American and Foreign Insurance
Co. of New York,35 there was a large disparity between the mone-
tary values of the loss claimed and the loss proved.36 But the in-
sured made the additional mistake of allowing his claim of loss to
exactly reflect the wholesale price of new merchandise, purportedly
to replace his old, deteriorated merchandise. Given these two fac-
tors, fraud as a matter of law was much more visible. There could
be no "innocent mistake" such that all the oldgoods were valued
just at wholesale.3 7 Nonetheless, some courts can find even qualita-
tive variations from the truth to be merely "careless oversights," 35
not necessitating a holding of "fraud."
F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1976). Actually, this test was used to justify presenting the question
of fraud to the jury after the trial judge.had ruled insufficiency of evidence as a matter of
law.
354. Saks & Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 23 N.Y.2d 161, 165-66, 242 N.E.2d 833, 835, 295
N.Y.S.2d 668, 671-72 (1968). The presumption of fraud would arise when the insured "can
only prove a small percentage of his claimed loss." Id. at 165, 242 N.E.2d at 835, 295 N.Y.S.2d
at 671. At this point, therefore, the insured has the burden of coming forward with a sound
explanation for the gaps in his evidence.
355. 256 F.2d 791 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
356. The insured had claimed approximately $78,000 for damages done by fire to his stock
of firearms. Those that were burned had almost without exception been cracked, sawed-off,
or simply were very old and of questionable value. The jury returned a verdict for $20,000.
256 F.2d at 792-93.
357. Another example of a "qualitative" difference between the proof of loss and the
evidence at trial is found in Lykos v. American Home Assurance Co., 452 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.
Il1. 1978). The insured had averred losses of $39,000 for "business interruption." The evidence
showed that the business was losing approximately $3,000 net per month. Id. at 536. The
dollar figure disparity is relatively insignificant in relation to the total amount claimed, but
such "mistakes" can hardly be presumed to be "inadvertent." The jury award in this case
was reversed. Id. at 537.
358. C-Suzanne Beauty Salon, Ltd. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 574 F.2d 106, 111 (2d
Cir. 1978). The insured had neglected to disclose the existence of a security interest in the
insured property. See also L & S Enterprises Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 457 (7th
Cir. 1971). There a $900 loss, claimed by the insured was actually attributable to a subsidiary.
The insignificance of the amount, despite its questionable inclusion, must have been an
important factor.
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There are many other examples of misrepresentations which can
serve to vitiate liability other than gross overvaluation of loss. One
of the essential elements of the fraud defense, however, which the
insurance company must prove, is "materiality." Misrepresen-
tations which have been deemed "material" are the cause of the
fire;' the existence of unnamed, possibly suspicious, cointerested
parties;10 the alleged existence of a sprinkler system;3"' and the
insured's activities on the day of the fire, and the identity of any
guests he may have had, even though no arson was alleged in the
case." 2 Courts are likely to view "materiality" relatively broadly,
because the purpose of the "fraud and false swearing" defense is to
insure truthfulness in the proof of loss. This is necessary, as the
United States Supreme Court said, to enable the insurance compa-
nies "to decided upon their obligations, and to protect themselves
against false claims. '363
3. The "Cooperation Clause"
The defense of "fraud or false swearing" is made more effective
by the section in the Standard Fire Insurance Policy which requires
the insured, following the filing of the sworn loss claimed, to submit
to examination by the insurance company.3 4 The requirement is
359. Esquire Restaurant, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1968).
The court therein said that "the proof of loss statements about the cause of the fire .. ,relied
upon by defendants as false, were so clearly material that the jury did not need a separate
definition of 'material fact' in order to follow Instruction 0 [dealing with the 'false swear-
ing' defense]." Id. at 115.
360. Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382, 385, 174 N.E. 761, 762 (1931).
361. Allstate Ins. Co. v. National Tea Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 449, 460, 323 N.E.2d 521, 528-
29 (1975). The insurance contract was voided even though the misstatements were made in
good faith. Here, the court utilized a "mutual mistake" rationale. It is interesting to note that
eleven years earlier the same court had held the failure to inform the insurer of pending
condemnation proceedings not to be a "material" misrepresentation. Di Leo v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 183, 192, 200 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1964).
362. Edmiston v. Schellenger, 343 So. 2d 465, 467 (Miss. 1977). The result in this case
was not changed by the fact that, two and one half years after the event, the insured corrected
the misrepresentation to the insurance company. The court rationalized that "materiality
should be judged at the time of the misrepresentation, not at the time of the trial." Id. at
467.
363. Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 95 (1884).
364. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6), lines 113-22 (McKinney 1966). This provision reads as fol-
lows:
The insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to any person
designated by this Company all that remains of any property herein described, and
submit to examinations under oath by any person named by this Company, and
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enforced by the fact that the insured forfeits any right to recovery
if there is a breach of the contractual duty of "cooperation.'' " In
order to invoke this provision to defeat an insured's recovery, the
requirement of an examination under oath, plus all the relevant
details must be carefully and thoroughly described."' This includes
the manifestation that the insurance company demands such an
interview, and is not simply "requesting" one."7
The traditional rule with regard to the "cooperation clause" is
that if the insured violates the requirements of the clause, the policy
is voided and the duty to indemnify no longer exists. 8 This viola-
tion can include attending the examination, but failing to answer
certain relevant questions .3  There is some authority, which is
rather negligible, that the insured can pick and choose answers in a
subscribe the same; and, as often as may be reasonably required, shall produce for
examination all books of account, bills, invoices and other vouchers, or certified copies
thereof if originals be lost, at such reasonable time and place as may be designated
by this Company or its representative, and shall permit extracts and copies thereof to
be made.
Id.
365. OSTRANDER, FIRE INSURANcE § 172 (2d ed. 1897). It is suggested that the forfeiture
only become effective upon prejudice to the insurer, in the case of reasonable delay. This is
offered as a safeguard to the rights of those falsely accused of criminal arson. 5A APPLEMAN,
supra note 332, § 3549 (Supp. 1978). This view has not found much support in the case law.
See Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 15. Contra, C-Suzanne Beauty Salon v. General Ins.
Co. of America, 574 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 384 infra.
366. Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Herpolsheimer, 77 Neb. 232, 109 N.W. 160 (1906), required the
time and place of the examination to be specified, as well as the identity of the person
authorized to conduct it. For a further discussion, see Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires,
12 THE FORUM 827, 843-44 (1977).
367. 574 F.2d at 111. The plaintiff-insured was informed that the insurance company
"requested" an examination. Because the plaintiff had not decided whether or not suit would
be brought, his attorney notified the defendant that he would not attend the examination.
The right to bring a suit at some later time was reserved in this letter. A few days before the
statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff brought suit. Id. General Insurance moved for
summary judgment on the basis of the violation of the "cooperation clause." The district
judge denied the motion, but ordered the plaintiff to submit to the sworn examination.
General Insurance was allowed the opportunity to renew the motion if prejudice could be
shown by the delay. The court later found that no prejudice had been shown. The court of
appeals affirmed this procedure. Although the equivocal nature of the defendant's notice of
the examination was considered, the decision was also based on more general considerations.
Id.
368. Gross v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 71 Misc. 2d 815, 337 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.
1972). One of the protections built into this harsh rule, however, is that the insured is entitled
to have an attorney present at this examination who may object on legal grounds to any
questions where such grounds are available. d. at 817, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
369. Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969).
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limited manner, by seeking a protective order following each indi-
vidual incriminating question.7 0 The requirement of full disclosure
of relevant information at the examination is not changed by the
existence of an indictment,37 1 nor by the insured's promise to make
arrangements for the examination when the criminal proceedings
come to a conclusion. 2 The majority rule seems to be that if a
material issue is left unanswered, the contract obligation of coopera-
tion has been breached and the contract is void.137
This is not, however, the absolute rule in all jurisdictions at all
times. Courts have devised other tests to determine whether the
"cooperation clause" has been satisfied. One court changed the
standard for effective compliance with the "cooperation clause" by
adding two conditions. 7' The condition is breached if discrepancies
in the insured's answers are not only material, but also "made in
bad faith .. .and prejudicial in effect." '375
In C-Suzanne Beauty Salon, Ltd. v. General Insurance Co., 37 the
370. See Hudson Tire Mart, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1975).
There, the court' refused to grant an injunction to postpone the examination until after
criminal charges were determined. It was said in this regard that "the requirement of his
appearance alone in no way violates his due process rights. Only after the incriminating
question is asked, is he in a position to assert his immunity and seek a protective order." Id.
at 674. However, the court later in the opinion notes that "[wihether the insured can
successfully assert its Fifth Amendment rights if it sues upon the policy, is another question
which is not now before us." Id. at 675 n.1. The court then cites two cases which rejected
plaintiffs' arguments that the due process clause protected them from the necessity of answer-
ing, while maintaining their suit. The view that fifth amendment rights may be protected
simultaneously with a successful action for insurance proceeds lacks any significant support
in the case law.
In fact, one court has expressly determined that the dictates of the standard fire policies
do not represent "state action," and therefore no fifth or fourteenth amendment rights are
subjected, in this context, to judicial enforcement. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49
(D. Conn. 1975). The court here decided that the purposes of the "cooperation clause" were
not to further the arson investigations of law enforcement officials, but rather to provide for
uniformity among insurance policies written in the state. Therefore, "the state has not been
involved in either compelling the questioning or imposing the economic consequences for a
refusal to answer to a sufficient extent to invoke Fifth Amendment protection." Id. at 55.
371. Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 184 Cal. 524, 195 P. 45 (1920); Restina v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 61 Misc. 2d 574, 306 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1969); cf. Hudson Tire Mart,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1975).
372. 61 Misc. 2d 574, 306 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
373. Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81 (1884).
374. Union Assurance Soc'y, Ltd. v. Garver, 223 Md. 412, 164 A.2d 879 (1960).
375. Id. at 416, 164 A.2d at 881. For use of a "good-bad faith" test, see Mulkey v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 243 S.C. 121, 126-27, 132 S.E.2d 278, 283 (1963).
376. 574 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 367 supra.
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court relied on language from an earlier New York Court of Appeals
case, Happy Hank Auction Co. v. American Eagle Fire Insurance
Co.,377 holding that to void the policy the insured must be guilty of
"a 'willful and fraudulent withholding of information.' ' 1 8 The court
also included the "materiality" requirement, utilizing the language
of another early New York Court of Appeals decision.379 It was there
stated that recovery could not be defeated on the basis of "technical
or unimportant omissions or defects in the performance by either
party." 380 Undoubtedly the court intended both of these considera-
tions, fraudulent intent and materiality, to represent the law in New
York. Happy Hank reaches the same conclusion.38' This divergence
from the majority interpretation of the cooperation clause is predi-
cated on the court's abhorrance of forfeitures.3 8
One lower New York court, borrowing from common law princi-
ples, applied a new feature for the first time to the "cooperation
clause" defense: "[T]he New York courts will not permit a party
who places the legality of his conduct in issue to unfairly prejudice
his adversary by asserting the privilege. '" The "privilege" to refuse
to answer questions at an insurance company examination may
shield a plaintiff-insured from incrimination, but not at the expense
of the defendant in a civil suit. Therefore, the "privilege" is avail-
able, under this rule, to non-party witnesses; this, however, may be
of little consequence as the insurance company can only compel the
insured, upon threat of avoiding liability, to submit to an examina-
tion. In essence, this is a "prejudice" test,34 which has an equitable
amount of "materiality" built into it. Presumably, a non-material
377. 1 N.Y.2d 534, 136 N.E.2d 842, 154 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1956).
378. 574 F.2d at 110 (citing language from Happy Hank, at 1 N.Y.2d at 539, 136 N.E.2d
at 844, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 873). This requirement sounds very much like the "bad faith" test of
Union Assurance Soc'y, Ltd. v. Garver. See note 375 supra.
379. 574 F.2d at 110.
380. Porter v. Traders' Ins. Co., 164 N.Y. 504, 509, 58 N.E. 641, 642-43 (1900).
381. 1 N.Y.2d at 539, 136 N.E.2d at 844, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
382. 574 F.2d at 110.
383. Cronk v. Cayuga County Patrons' Fire Relief Ass'n, 90 Misc. 2d 945, 948, 396
N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
384. The trial court in C-Suzanne Beauty Salon, Ltd. had employed a "prejudice" test,
but, because of the unusual circumstances of the case, had placed the burden of going forward
with the proof on the insurance company. 574 F.2d at 111. The court of appeals could not let
it rest, however, with a "prejudice to the insurer"-type test, and felt compelled to add
"materiality" and "fraudulent intent" as well. See notes 378-79 supra and accompanying
text.
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omission would not be so significant, by definition, as to "prejudice"
the insurer. This case has also received favorable comment else-
where.385
The question of "materiality" is usually a matter of fact.3 18 Of
course, there are some subjects which are so obviously material that
disclosure thereof can be compelled as a matter of law.387 Production
of documents may be subjected to the same "materiality" tests. 311
Due to the mandatory language in which the "cooperation clause"
is couched,"' the provisions of this clause are usually applied to the
letter. 90 There seem to be at least two ways for an insured to avoid
the examination requirement altogether: disappearance, with no
imputable knowledge of the fire,'3 ' and deportation. 392 Short of these
rather draconian alternatives, a person fearing criminal sanctions is
well advised either to argue the immateriality of the concealed facts,
or suffer the loss of the insurance proceeds.
4. The "Increase of Hazard" Defense
Another technical defense to a claim for fire insurance proceeds
is the "increase of hazard" clause. 3 3 This has been described as,
inter alia, a non-disapprobatory method of penalizing the commis-
sion of a crime. 311 In an effort to avoid accusing a plaintiff of incen-
385. See Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 15.
386. 1 N.Y.2d at 539, 136 N.E.2d at 844, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
387. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 638 (Miss. 1975). There,
material omissions included source of the fire, insured's financial condition, and the financing
of title to the house.
388. E.g., two frequently requested documents are tax returns and bank deposit figures.
Production, vel non, of these items, where the insured's own financial records have allegedly
been destroyed in the fire, have sometimes been regarded as a matter of fact on the issue of
cooperation clause compliance. Happy Hank Auction Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 1
N.Y.2d at 539, 136 N.E.2d at 843, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 873. On other occasions, failure to provide
such documentation has been held a "material" breach as a matter of law. Southern Guar.
Ins. Co. v. Dean, 172 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1965).
389. See note 220 supra.
390. This is meant literally as well as figuratively. At least one author has commented
upon the significance of the "s" at the end of the word "examinations" in line 116 of the
Standard Fire Policy. Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 15. In other words, an insurer is
expressly not limited to a single examination of the insured.
391. Nicolai v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 61 Wash. 2d 295, 378 P.2d 287 (1963).
392. Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949).
393. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6), lines 28-32 (McKinney 1966). Lines 28-32 provide that:
"Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss
occurring (a) while the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of
the insured. See 5 APPLEMAN, supra note 332, §§ 2941-48.
394. Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 14.
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diarism, a juror will be able to act on his suspicions to deny recovery
based on a technical "increase of hazard." The increase must have
occurred between the time the policy was entered into and the time
of the fire; the insurance company can not have been made aware
of this "increase," remain silent, continue to collect premiums, and
then expect the clause to vitiate liability. 5' Except, perhaps, in an
extreme case, the "increase" refers to that which is practiced regu-
larly over time, and not simply an isolated occurrence or act."' The
question as to whether the increase of hazard is to result in the
forfeiture of recovery is usually one of fact.
Although the statutes in each state may vary to a minor degree,
most follow the example of the New York Standard Fire Policy."'
The test for identifying an "increase of hazard" is clearly spelled out
there: liability is defeated where the hazard is "increased by any
means within the control or knowledge of the insured.""3 ' In some
states, other tests are expressly required by statute."' Peculiar inter-
395. Garcy Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 353 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Briney v. Tri-State
Mut. Grain Dealers Fire Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 673, 117 N.W.2d 889 (1962).
396. Gorton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 339 F. Supp. 241 (D. Mass. 1972); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 351 Mass. 113, 218 N.E.2d 64 (1966). See also Note, The
Increase-of-Hazard Clause in the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 76 HAIv. L. RPv. 1472,
1472-73 (1963).
397. See note 220 supra.
398. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(6), lines 31-32 (McKinney 1966). See also 5 APPLEMAN, supra
note 332, § 2941 n.30 and accompanying text. Probably due to a lack of clarity by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bachmann, 285 U.S. 112 (1932), the clause is
often held to require an increase within the "knowledge and control" of the insured as opposed
to the disjunctive form used in the Standard Fire Policy. See, e.g., Di Leo v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 50 Il. App. 2d at 191, 200 N.E.2d at 409. In Bachmann, Brandeis uses
"knowledge and control" seven times and "knowledge or control" four times. (emphasis
supplied). Such uses appear almost indiscriminate. However, the insurer "alleged" that the
acts were within the insured's knowledge and control (emphasis supplied). 285 U.S. at 114.
Perhaps this was the higher standard the insurer ill-advisedly attempted to meet, and not
the easier burden disjoining the levels of involvement. Brandeis later cites the trial judge's
instruction, employing "or" as the correct form. Id. at 118. This must be seen as the control-
ling principle. The mistake in Di Leo, however, is quite understandable in the circumstances.
For a catalogue of cases supporting the Di Leo result, see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson-
Keith & Co., 247 F.2d 249, 259 (8th Cir. 1957).
399. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 515.101, 515.102 (1949): A policy condition "shall not
prevent recovery . ..if it shall be shown by the plaintiff that the failure to observe such
provision or the violation thereof did not contribute to the loss." A clause in a fire insurance
policy requiring only the traditional knowledge and control of the means of increasing the
hazard was held, in Iowa, to be "inoperative." Hawkeye Chem. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1975). The same test, in essence, was judicially required in
South Carolina. Boatwright v. Aetna Ins. Co., 1 Strob. (S.C.) 281 (1847).
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pretations of the standard test do appear occasionally. A Florida
court, intending that the insurer's liability be vitiated if the hazard
were materially increased, require, instead, that the change effect
"a material and substantial increase in hazard."1 A recent federal
district court decision, in dictum only, characterized the defense as
available when "the insured performs acts which are reasonably
calculated to increase the risk and which he knows or should know
will increase the risk."'' The inclusion of "calculation" (presuma-
bly, "intent to defraud") in the requirements of the "increase of
hazard" clause is clearly erroneous. 02 Otherwise, the clause would
simply be coextensive with the "fraud and false swearing" defense.
A curious theory, which has long existed in many different forms,
is the idea that this defense is also available for an increase of the
"moral hazard." 03 In purest form, such an increase occurs when the
400. Smith v. Peninsular Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 212,,214 (Fla. App. 1965). This language
was taken from 8 COUCH, supra note 249, § 37:695:
A provision avoiding insurance because of an alteration in the situation or circumstan-
ces which would increase the risk contemplates such alteration as would materially and
substantially enhance the hazard, as viewed by a person of ordinary intelligence, care,
and diligence. A mere trifling increase will not avoid-the policy; rather, there must be
a substantial and material increase, such as the insurer, in view of the terms of the
policy, could not reasonably be presumed to have contracted to assume.
Because "material" and "substantial" are used together, one would normally be led to believe
that they meant different things. But as the increase is described in the second sentence
above, it is clear that the "materiality" test (i.e., was the change "material" enough so that
if the insurers were given the opportunity, they would enter the insurance contract on differ-
ent terms) is sufficient to vitiate liability, vel non. Although this relatively minor method of
phrasing is not likely to 'cause much confusion, it may have played a significant role in
influencing the decision in Cabella v. Travelers Indem. Co., 248 So. 2d 539 (Fla. App. 1971).
For further discussion of the Smith case, see 19 A.L.R.3d 1326 (1968).
401. Plaza Equities Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
402. See Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 238, 243 (8th Cir.
1972). The Plaza Equities Corp. court's mistake is, at least, understandable. Their reliance
was placed upon Brooks Upholstering Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 257, 149 N.W.2d 502
(1967). In that case, the "intentional" language was used because there was a Minnesota
statute (Minn. Stat. § 65.011, subd. 11) which limited the suspension of insurance coverage
with regard to the use of, inter alia, sprinkler systems. The Brooks court determined that if
the insured intended to turn the system off, and leave it off, this may have been sufficient,
considering the "increase of hazard" clause, to supersede the statute.
Secondly, the Plaza Equities Corp. court's phrasing might, if liberally viewed, be seen as
requiring nothing more than "regular" acts, i.e., not simply the occurrence of a single, negli-
gent act, causitive of the damage.
403. See, e.g., Knowles v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. of Greensboro, N.C., 177 La. 941, 149 So.
528 (1933).
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insured loses any substantial interest in protecting the property
from damage. 40 , Given the existence of a fire insurance policy, this
loss is usually seen as equivalent to an affirmative interest in the
destruction of the property.'0 5 This doctrine constitutes an exception
to the general rule that the "hazard" which has been increased must
be physical in nature.406
Conditions which have triggered the "moral hazard" defense have
included financial difficulties, and the inability to put the building
to its intended use.407 These rationales for the utilization of the
"moral hazard" defense, however, are against the greater weight of
the modern authority. 08 At least one jurisdiction has determined
that to procure additional insurance covering the same property as
is already adequately insured constitutes "increase of moral haz-
ard" as a matter of law.4" The reasoning behind this rule' is that
insurance coverage in excess of the value of the property is an invita-
tion to arson; a profit motive is introduced by the additional insur-
ance. Although courts may be more likely to find an "increase in
hazard" by the fact that the insured premises are used for illegal
purposes, there is no necessary relation between the two.'10
Triers of fact may be reluctant to formally accuse a person of
arson, even in a civil context. "Moral hazard" may be an appro-
priate defense in such circumstances. The jury, for example, may
404. Nemojeski v. Bubolz Mut. Town Fire Ins. Co., 271 Wis. 561, 564, 74 N.W.2d 196,
198 (1956). For a discussion of whether mortgages, liens, and other. encumbrances constitute
increases of the moral hazard so as to avoid a fire insurance policy, see 56 A.L.R.2d 419 (1957).
405. 271 Wis. at 564, 74 N.W.2d at 197.
406. The majority rule on this point is stated in Esbjornsson v. Buffalo Ins. Co., 252 Minn.
269, 275-76, 89 N-.W.2d 893, 898 (1958).
407. Future Realty, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. i109 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
The court, no doubt, was also greatly influenced by the suspicious circumstances surrounding
the fire.
408. Charles Stores, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 64, 68-69 n.4 and accompanying text
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Illinois FAIR Plan Ass'n, [1975] Finx &.CAs. CASES (CCH)
1145 (N.D. Ill.). The court in Illinois FAIR Plan ruled that the increase of hazard defense
was only available following changes in the "use" of the property, and not after changes "in
the mental or moral state of the insured." The opinion continues that "the increased risk
against which the clauses guard is that the property will burn and not that the insured will
burn it. (cite omitted)." Id. at 1146.
409. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Merchants & Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 1143, 1145 (6th
Cir. 1970); Shouse v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Ohio 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 361 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1966)..
410. Boston Ins. Co. v. Read, 166 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1948); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Haney,
108 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1959).
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view the evidence as overwhelming that the insured at least knew
how and when the fire started, and probably had something to do
with the incendiarism. This defense may make available a tempered
expression that the insured should not be allowed to recover. The
theory is that the insured was there, could have prevented the con-
flagration, and by not doing so, increased the risk that damage
would be done."' The failure to act is the "moral" breach. The
interpretation of the language in the Standard Fire Policy is tor-
tured, but "moral hazard" theory developed as a flexible standard.
It is one that should be used sparingly, if at all.
The defense of "increase of hazard" is often used in unusual cases
where the judge or one of the adversaries specifically wants to avoid
proving something which, although obvious, might for one reason or
another be difficult to prove. In Wilson v. Concordia Farmers Mu-
tual Insurance Co.," 2 the judge declined to explore the rights of an
"innocent" co-owner of property on the grounds that her apparent
knowledge of the incendiarism precluded her recovery on "increase
of hazard" grounds . 13 In Balen Developing Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co.,"' the court pointed out that even where the
"vacancy" defense"5 is unavailable because of a clause in the insur-
ance policy itself, "abandonment" may constitute an "increase of
hazard" so as to defeat recovery."' Clearly, the defense can be used
very flexibly, based upon the exigencies of each individual case.
5. The "Vacant or Unoccupied" Defense
Vacancy or unoccupancy of the insured property, typically for a
period in excess of sixty days," 7 is a technical defense for the insur-
ance company in a suit for payment on the policy. This defense
varies only slightly among jurisdictions. Like the "increase of haz-
411. See, e.g., Collins v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 296 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1961); Pueppka
v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 781, 87 N.W.2d 410 (1958).
412. 479 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App. 1972).
413. Id. at 161.
414. [1975] FIRE & CAS. CASES (CCH) 825 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co.).
415. See pt. IV(D)(5) infra.
416. [19751 FIRE & CAS. CASES (CCH) at 828-29.
417. N.Y. INs. LAw § 168(6), lines 28-35 (McKinney 1966). Lines 28-35 state that:
"[ulnless otherwise provided in writing added hereto the Company shall not be liable for
loss occurring. . .(b) while a described building, whether intended for occupancy by owner
or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive days." A period of
thirty or ninety days is occasionally specified, usually in a rider to the policy.
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ard" clause, " " a breach of this provision will provide the insurer with
a complete defense to payment on the policy. The policy, however,
is not voided following the breach. The provision acts merely to
"suspend the insurance and the policy coverage may be revived by
compliance with its terms before loss.""' In order to take advantage
of this defense, the insurer need not return or offer to return prem-
iums paid during the period of vacancy or unoccupancy 2 10
"Vacant" is generally defined to mean "empty or deprived of
contents or without inanimate objects." '' The second term,
''unoccupied," deals with the human use of the insured building,
and varies with each insured and each building. "It should be con-
strued with reference to the nature and character of the building for
the use contemplated by the parties.""42 When, as in the New York
Standard Fire Policy,' the words are used in the disjunctive, they
are never regarded as synonymous or complimentary, 24 although
they may commonly mean the same thing to a layperson. Although
such provisions in insurance policies, where ambiguous, must al-
ways be construed in favor of the insured, there seems to be a greater
tendency toward leniency for homeowner-insureds, 25 and a stricter
418. The two defenses occasionally overlap. In Future Realty, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 315 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (S.D. Miss. 1970), the court used unoccupancy as one of the
factors to be considered as to whether or not the plaintiff-insured has "increased the risk."
Unoccupancy has been held, however, not to be equivalent to increase of hazard as a matter
of law, although it may be a consideration for the trier of fact. Knoff v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 447 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
419. Knight v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 123 Ga. App..833, 834, 182 S.E.2d 693,
695 (1971).
420. Dunton v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 1967).
421. 123 Ga. App. at 835, 182 S.E.2d at 695. See also 8 COUCH, supra note 249, § 37: 845,
848. See Belgrade v. National Am. Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 44, 47, 22 Cal. Rptr. 21, 22,
where the court upheld the jury's verdict based on a finding of vacancy, on the basis of "how
sparsely the house was furnished."
422. 123 Ga. App. at 835, 182 S.E.2d at 695.
423. See note 220 supra.
424. 123 Ga. App. at 835, 182 S.E.2d at 695.
425. See, e.g., Drummond v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 343 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. App. 1960). In
this case, the all-important "purpose of the premises" test as to "occupancy," vel non, was
deemphasized, although the insured could conceivably have triumphed anyway. But the
court said that the terms of the policy "might be satisfied where one 'is there possessio pedis,
such as a caretaker or watchman.'" Id. at 87. Such a change from the "use contemplated by
the parties" for the insured building would never maintain the insurance in force for business
premises. "Storage" is almost always insufficient to show "occupancy." 4A APPLEMAN, supra
note 332, § 2840. However, storage of clothing and furniture in an apartment was sufficient
for "occupancy" even though no one was living in the apartment. Burrell v. Seguros America
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interpretation as to insured businesses."'
Usually the "vacant or unoccupied" clause contemplates some
change in the use of the insured premises. The majority rule is that
if the insurance company can be imputed with knowledge of the
vacancy prior to entering into the policy agreement, it waives this
defense, at least as to the known violation of the clause . 7 Occasion-
ally this result is not reached unless there is an expectation that the
premises Will remain vacant beyond the period permitted by the
clause. 28
The length of time beyond which the property cannot remain
vacant or unoccupied without forfeiting the insurance coverage is
sixty days in the Standard Fire Policy.' This period begins to run
at the time of issuance of the policy. 30 Even where the statutory
requirement exists, the sixty day feature can be changed, to the
point of removing the clause altogether, by a rider to the policy.',
An insignificant amendment to the policy will not begin the sixty
day period anew.'32 After a first fire, the new sixty day period will
not begin to run with respect to a potential second fire until after
the insurer has finalized its plans for the building.'33
Banamex, S.A., 316 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 1975). Where a home was insured, the misrepresen-
tation as to the occupation by tenants of the insured premises was held immaterial. Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 253 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1958).
426. "Storage" of business-related articles does not indicate that the building was occu-
pied. Dunton v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 329, 330 (7th Cir. 1967). Where a hotel
and tavern were no longer operating, and the premises were put up for sale, with heating still
on, and the liquor license maintained, the court held that the building was "unoccupied" as
a matter of law. Kern Hotel &.Tavern, -Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App. 3d 196, 332 N.E.2d
197 (1975).
427. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New Albany, 146 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1962); Stuart
v. United States Fire Ins. Policy, 18 N.C. App. 518, 197 S.E.2d 250 (1973).
428. Conley v. Queen Ins. Co., 256 Ky. 602, 76 S.W.2d 906 (1934).
429. See note 220 supra.
430. Kolivera v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 356, 290 N.E.2d 356 (1972). Remark-
ably, there is a case where fire destroyed the insured premises more than sixty days after
"issuance," but less than sixty days after delivery of the policy to the insured. The court said
that the time requirement should start running at the point of delivery. Hurst v. Donegal &
Conoy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 224 S.C. 188, 78 S.E.2d 189 (1953).
431. Brannan v. Republic Ins. Co., 495 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Colo. App. 1972).
432. Thatcher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 226 A.2d 919 (Del. Super. 1967). Here, one of the
insureds merely deleted his name from the policy, having assigned his right in the property
to the other insured under the policy. All other conditions, by the terms of the General
Endorsement, were to "remain the same." Id. at 920. The court felt that beginning a new
period (in this case, ninety days) would not accurately reflect the intent of the parties. Id. at
925.
433. DeVanzo v. Newark Ins. Co., 44 A.D.2d 39, 353 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1974). The insurer, in
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E. Cointerested Parties
Serious, bona fide losses usually attend an arson; any number of
innocent people may have legitimately suffered harm from the fire.
Such people, in addition to the arsonist, may have an insurable
interest in the damaged property. The rights of those who are in no
way culpable for the acts of incendiarism should be protected as a
matter of public policy. Where the evidence links the arsonist to the
insured plaintiff only to the extent of co-ownership, the plaintiff will
be allowed to recover for the loss. 3' However, as the relationship and
interest become closer, the law becomes less clear as to a right of
recovery.
The fact that the arsonist and the plaintiff are or were married
has frequently been considered. It is likely that the courts will be
somewhat more lenient toward a close relationship other than mar-
riage.1ss The traditional rule is that an innocent spouse of the arson-
ist cannot recover for damage done to the jointly owned or com-
munity property. ' -s If the arson can fairly be characterized as a
New York, has a thirty day period in which to decide whether to exercise the option to repair,
replace, or rebuild the property damaged by fire. That period was simply added to the sixty
day "vacant or unoccupied" limit, even though the insurer had decided not to repair the
building, as the plaintiff could "not be sure of its disinclination" to repair until the thirty
days had elapsed. Id. at 43, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
434. Varano v. Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 164 Pa. Super. 228, 63 A.2d 97 (1949). The
plaintiff and the arsonist were joint owners of a two-family home, and maintained separate
insurance policies. No evidence was proffered connecting the plaintiff to the incendiary act.
435. See, e.g., Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942).
Here, the plaintiff was a cotenant in common, and a coinsured with the arsonist. Although it
is not stated in the opinion, it is highly likely that they were also relatives. Nevertheless, the
court cited a policy preference for insurance policies to be construed as "several," unless
clearly and specifically made "joint." Id. at 244, 29 A.2d at 123. Hence, a broader right of
recovery was allowed. An innocent remainderman of a trust, who was also the wrongdoer's
son, was allowed recovery, plus the additional amount of his father's life estate in the trust
income. Mercantile Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1967).
If, however, the court finds evidence of a conspiracy, the treatment of the insured conspirator
will be as harsh as that of the arsonist. Nathan v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 74, 86
N.W.2d 503 (1957).
Contra, Williams v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 193 So. 202 (La. App. 1939), where the act
of one spouse for another was held to be no different from any other agential act. Id. at 204.
436. California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1956); Home Ins. Co. v. Pugh, 51
Ala. App. 373, 286 So. 2d 49 (1973) (dictum); Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601,
13 N.E.2d 423 (1938); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 565, 99
N.W.2d 865 (1959). The rule is the same if the parties are separated, Bridges v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), or divorced, Jones v. Fidelity &
Guaranty Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). This result was justified by the
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"joint enterprise" in behalf of both spouses, the court will deny
recovery to both.'7
There seems to be a trend against the traditional rule. In Wiscon-
sin, a court granted reformation of a policy to delete the arsonist-
wife's name and allowed the husband to recover. '38 A New Jersey
case recently held that the interest in the property, or the rights and
obligations under the contract of insurance are not material to the
right, vel non, of an innocent, insured spouse to recover. 39 What did
concern the court was the liability specifically for the arson or fraud.
It was held that whether the property interest was joint or several,
the responsibility for the fire was, at least in this case, several. " '
This focus upon liability for the fire itself was utilized by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine, even though it may have worked a
small benefit in favor of the arsonist."' As there has always been a
fact that the rights and obligations under the policy were "joint" when entered into, and no
change was made subsequent to the divorce.
437. Wilson v. Concordia Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d at 161. Here, both spouses
acted together to remove the possessions from the house. After the fire, the husband acted
for both in signing and filing the proof of loss. Although neither of these cited characteristics
evince conspiratorial motives, as the couple was in the process of moving into a new house, a
"joint enterprise" was found. One commentator has suggested that this particular theory calls
for an investigation into the projected longevity of the marriage at the time of the fire. See
Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 9.
438. Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 159 N.W.2d 89
(1968). Under the facts of the case, this was clearly the equitable result. The husband was
the sole owner of the property, and the wife's name was added to the policy only pursuant
to a Farmers Home Administration mortgage agreement. The court concluded, however, by
declining to deny recovery to an insured spouse when the arson could not be imputed to him
or her. In an attempt to liberalize this area of the law, the court said that "[miarried people
are still individuals and responsible for their own acts. Vicarious liability is not an attribute
of marriage." Id. at 249, 159 N.W.2d at 93.
439. Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974).
440. Id. at 354, 327 A.2d at 242.
441. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978). The husband
and wife had purchased a home, giving a real estate mortgage to a bank as security for the
unpaid purchase price. Following the fire and pursuant to the terms of a mortgage clause in
the policy, the insurer paid $15,872 to the bank for the property loss to the extent of their
interest. Previously, the husband, who intentionally ignited the fire, had agreed to convey
his interest in the property to the plaintiff-wife to avoid creditors. Id. at 331 n.4. The court
did not attempt to determine the validity of this transaction. In either event, however, the,
husband was still potentially liable on the note to the bank, which was paid by the insurer.
The court, perhaps realistically, did not suggest subrogation as a solution to this problem.
Instead, the court said that the plaintiff's recovery would not benefit the husband "to an
extent that violates public policy." Id. at 332. A clear distinction was made between that
which was paid to the bank and that paid to the plaintiff. The resolution of this apparent
inequity, if such were possible, was left to the retrial. Repayment of the note could reasonably
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strong policy against any direct or indirect benefit flowing to wrong-
doers from their improper acts, however, the court took every pre-
caution to limit this effect.
Where arson is committed by one of the interested parties in a
corporation, the liability of the insurer will depend upon the status,
powers, and duties of the arsonist. Clearly, unless otherwise agreed,
if the owner were the arsonist, the insurer would not be liable to the
owner, nor to another cointerested party whose rights of recovery
were derivative to those of the owner-insured. "2 A part owner may,
by his incendiary act, defeat recovery for the corporation,4 3 but,
generally, recovery will be allowed, with care being exercised not to
enrich the arsonist."' The corporation was denied recovery in one
case where the fire had been set by the general manager, who was
also an officer and director."5 Language in a jury instruction to the
effect that a corporate plaintiff could recover "even if one of its
officers set the fire unless he was the sole owner," was apparently
affirmed, " but this simplistic methodology is nowhere else applied.
A number of different tests have developed to determine whether
a corporation may recover when the fire was set by a person with
some interest in the corporation. One case provided that an insurer
would not be liable where the incendiarist was acting "with the
be seen to benefit the plaintiff as well as her husband, the arsonist. Therefore, the court, at
retrial, might well decide to reduce the insurer's liability commensurate at least with the gain
sustained by the plaintiff.
442. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 437 Pa: 463, 263 A.2d 448 (1970).
As conditional vendor of personalty to the insured-arsonist, the plaintiff in this case sought
recovery under the standard mortgage clause or pursuant to a special lender's loss payee
clause purportedly agreed upon at issuance. See also Imperial Kosher Catering, Inc. v. Trav-
eler's Indem. Co., 73 Mich. App. 543, 252 N.W.2d 509 (1977), where recovery was denied to a
corporation due to the incendiarism of one or both of the principal shareholders.
443. Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 18 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1927). In this case,
however, there were many contributing factors to this result. For a discussion, see notes 447-
54 infra and accompanying text.
444. See 18 COUCH, supra note 249, § 74:670.
445. Osvaldo Varane, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 362 Mass. 864, 284 N.E.2d 923 (1972).
It is probable that the court was strongly influenced by the fact that the principal stockholder
in the corporation was the arsonist's wife. See also Northern Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes
Shop, 32 Del. 406, 125 A. 184 (1924).
446. Esquire Restaurant, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. of N.Y., 393 F.2d 111, 115 (7th
Cir. 1968). The court said that because of this instruction, it was necessary to determine who
"were the actual stockholders on the date of the fire." Id. The court's instruction on this issue
was then affirmed. The court, therefore, seemed to give tacit approval to this "test" of the
right of recovery in the corporate context. No support for this position was cited in the
opinion, however.
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authorization, knowledge or ratification of the corporation." '447 A
recent case permitted recovery based upon a test meaning essen-
tially the same thing: the arsonist's acts were found outside of the
insured's "procurement, privity, or asset."4 8 The most frequently
used method, however, of determining liability is to consider pri-
marily who will be the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds. Per-
haps the most sensible statement of this rule is the very inclusive
one set forth in Miller & Dobrin Fur Co., Inc. v. Camden Fire Insur-
ance Co. Ass'n."' The alleged arsonist was an officer, director, and
one of the principal stockholders in the corporation. Recovery was
denied following a three-pronged test: first, the arsonist would
"substantially benefit" from the payment; second, this person
"dominated the affairs" of the corporation; and third, the other
cointerested parties had allowed him to take this control. 50 These
considerations are implicit in another more simply stated test
wherein "the basic function of the court is to see that no one takes
advantage of his own wrong. . . either directly or indirectly.' 51 In
one case, it was apparent that the arsonist himself could not benefit
by the payment of insurance proceeds." 2 Therefore, the court sug-
gested another test, molded from criminal law principles, that a
principal cannot recover having "authorized, consented to, advised,
aided or encouraged" his agent's incendiary acts. 53 Primarily on the
basis that a principal will not be assumed to have "authorized" a
criminal act, recovery under the policy was permitted. One case has
447. Charles Stores, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 428 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1970). The alleged
arsonist was a vice president and director of the insured corporation.
448. Owl & Turtle, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 554 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1977).' For
this language, the court relied upon 18 CoucH, supra note 249, § 74:699.
449. 55 N.J. Super. 205, 150 A.2d 276 (1959).
450. Id. at 213, 150 A.2d at 280. This rule, perhaps, could be seen as dictum, as the court
later came to the conclusion that the alleged arsonist was really a member of a partnership,
rather than a stockholder in a corporation. Id. at 223, 150 A.2d at 286. The rule with regard
to partnerships is quite different from that regarding corporations. Incendiarism committed
or procured by a partner will defeat all other partners' rights of recovery. The difference,
simply, is that "copartners are agents one for the other, which is not the case with stockhold-
ers of a corporation." Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 18 F.2d 563, 567 (4th Cir.
1927). This rule is well-settled, a different result being reached only where it was shown that
the arsonist-partner burned property used by the partnership, which was owned exclusively
by the innocent partner. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 258 Ala. 141, 61 So. 2d 19 (1952).
451. Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 267 Cal. 2d 381, 385, 73 Cal. Rptr.
182, 185 (1968).
452. Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of North America, 236 Cal. 2d 349, 45 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1965).
453. Id. at 355, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
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suggested a stricter test where the evidence adduces a fraudulent
motive in the procurement of the insurance policy. 5' This distinc-
tion, however, has not subsequently been made.
The law is well settled as to the mortgagee's right to recover
insurance proceeds following the mortgagor's breach of the policy
conditions. The result turns entirely on the type of mortgage clause
signed. There are two predominant types: "simple, loss-payable" or
"open" mortgage clauses; and "union" or "standard" mortgage
clauses.' 55 Under the former, the mortgagee's rights are "derivative"
to those of the mortgagor, ' are "payable as interests may ap-
pear,""' 7 and the insurer is not liable to the mortgagee if there is no
liability to the mortgagor-insured.5 8 The more frequently adopted
clause is the "standard" mortgage clause, which, in effect, creates
a separate contract of insurance between the insurer and the mort-
gagee.459 Pursuant to this clause, the mortgagee can recover from the
insurer despite the wrongful "acts or neglect" of the mortgagor. 0
This legal right also extends to the mortgagee's assignee. 6'
There is some authority to the effect that a standard mortgage
clause only protects mortgagees of real property, or personal prop-
erty so innately annexed to the property as to be "bound" thereto."2
454. Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 18 F.2d 563, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1927).
455. For complete discussions of this topic, see 43 AM. Jun. 2d Insurance § § 765-70 (1955);
24 A.L.R.3d 435 §§ 1-5 (1969).
456. State Securities Co. v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co., 204 F.
Supp. 207, 222 (D. Neb. 1960), noting that to allow persons to profit from their "rascality,"
even indirectly, is contra bonos mores. Id. at 218.
457. Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Ford, 120 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D.N.M. 1954). However, the. "as
interests may appear" language may also -be found in "union" or "standard" mortgage
clauses, wherein the right of recovery of the mortgagee is preserved. See, e.g., National
Commercial Bank v. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Misc. 2d 701, 334 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
458. 43 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance § 767 (1955). The rule has also been stated that this
mortgage clause "makes the mortgagee merely 'an appointee to collect the insurance money
due to the insured in case of loss, and such mortgagee must claim in the right of the insured,
and not in his own.' (cites omitted)." Insurance Co. of North America v. Gulf Oil Corp., 106
Ga. App. 382, 384, 127 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1962).
459. Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 40 Mich. App. 618, 199 N.W.2d 287 (1972); MFA Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Huddleston, 459 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. App. 1970); First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
Nichols, 33 A.D.2d 259, 306 N.Y.S.2d 542 (4th Dep't 1970); Old Colony Co-op Bank v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 114 R.I. 289, 332 A.2d 434 (1975). The liability under this
"separate contract," of course, is only to the extent of the mortgage debt. 459 S.W.2d at 106.
460. 43 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance § 769 (1955).
461. Mobile Construction Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 119 Ill. App. 2d 329, 256 N.E.2d 149
(1970).
462. Landford v. Public Fire Ins. Co., 282 Mass. 323, 185 N.E. 21 (1933); Wilcox v. Mut.
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Creditors or conditional vendors of personalty are protected, in-
stead, by "lender's loss payable clauses.""' 3 Such clauses will typi-
cally subject mortgagees to the same conditions as those of "open"
or "loss payable" mortgage clauses."4 The courts taking exception
to this "rule" have, perhaps, consistently outnumbered the adher-
ents.1 5 Even if this rule once represented the weight of authority,
the current trend is clearly against it.4"6
These rules have been modified in some states by statute to give
further protection to mortgagees."17 At the same time, there is grow-
ing recognition of the part played by mortgages in arson for profit
schemes.' "Straw" mortgages provide a relatively safe financial
interest in property slated for destruction. Many arsonists also have
an interest in the corporation which becomes the mortgagee. If the
arsonist is caught, it is at least possible that his company may
recover for the fire. Therefore, the statute in aid of mortgagees may
be unwise encouragements. Instead of offering the luxuries of ig-
norance or conspiracy to prospective mortgagees, perhaps their right
Fire Ins. Co., 81 Minn. 478, 84 N.W. 334 (1900); Spangler v. Union Nat'l Mount Joy Bank,
125 Pa. Super. 31, 35, 189 A. 541, 542 (1937).
463. 437 Pa. 463, 263 A.2d 448 (1970). See note 442 supra.
464. Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 7.
465. Motors Sec. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co. of Hartford, 17 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 1944), where
chattel mortgagee of an automobile was allowed to recover, despite the arson of the mortga-
gor. See also Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Mortgage Co., 250 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d 352
(1948); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co., 120 Ga. App. 133, 169 S.E.2d
695 (1969) (where conditions specifying personal property were included in agreement); Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Associates Capital Corp., 313 So. 2d 404 (Miss. 1975); Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Southwestern Fin. Co., 297 P.2d 403 (Okla. 1956); Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Golden,
127 Tex. 93, 91 S.W.2d 695 (1936).
466. J.B. Kramer Grocery Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1974);
Citywide Knitwear Processing Co., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 36 N.Y.2d 717, 367
N.Y.S.2d 485, 327 N.E.2d 638 (1975). For a discussion of this development, see Taylor Ad-
dress, supra note 264, at 7-8.
467. See, e.g., TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.15 (Vernon 1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5695
(1956). These statutes have been interpreted to mandate standard mortgage clause provisions
in fire insurance policies. Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Golden, 127 Tex. 93, 91 S.W.2d 695 (1936);
Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 234 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1970).
468. See MASSACHuSum'S ARSON PRFvENION TASK FORCE, REPORT 20 (Dec. 15, 1978). Two
suggestions made in this report to involve mortgage institutions in the fight against arson-
fraud are: property tax payments should be "escrowed by the mortgagee and be paid by the
owner in monthly installments with his mortgage payments. . . and [mlortgage companies
should be regulated . . . in the same manner as other lenders." Id. at 21. Also noting the
mortgagee as a potential arson beneficiary are: Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires, 12 Tim
FORUM 827, 827-28 (1977); 124 CONG. REc. S7994 (daily ed., May 22, 1978) (quoting article
from the Washington Post, May 8, 1978).
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of recovery should be limited by statute, rather than broadened. 6'
The field is, at least, ripe for study and reconsideration.
V. Conclusion
It is indisputable that arson for profit is a large and growing
problem. There is a community of opinion which favors the imposi-
tion of a more extensive duty to combat this problem upon the fire
insurance companies.470 This is an economic conclusion which must
take into account profit rates and levels of premiums. Aside from
these issues, the public policy of a private organization acting in the
nature of a law enforcement agency must be examined.
As a private litigant, an insurance company has certain benefits
unavailable to public agencies. An insurer needs no search warrant
to investigate the premises of an attempted arson-fraud,47" ' while an
officer or agent of the police is constrained by the cases interpretting
the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 2 The constitu-
tional mandates of access to counsel, and protection against invol-
untary "confessions," do not always limit the techniques of investi-
gative agents of private companies. Where such rights are violated
by the police, the "fruits" of such tactics may still be available in
the civil forum. 73 The criminal defendant has the benefit of the
sixth amendment compulsory process and confrontation clauses not
available to plaintiffs in civil cases.'74 An insured-plaintiff can be
469. For two suggested changes, see note 468 supra. One potential restriction, as yet
unconsidered, is to statutorily mandate standard mortgage protection, unless the insurer can
show that the mortgagee was or reasonably should have been aware of major health or
building code violations or other technical defenses (e.g., insured's misrepresentation, in-
crease of hazard, or vacancy or unoccupancy) at the time the mortgage was procured. If such
evidence is proffered, the mortgagee's rights should then become derivative upon those of the
mortgagor-insured. This, of course, involves issues far beyond the scope of this Comment, and
much inquiry is needed before the feasibility of such a statute is assured.
470. See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON GOVERNMEN-
TAL AFFAIRS, ROLE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN DEALING wITH ARsON-FOR-PROFIT, 10-13 (Feb-
ruary 1979).
471. Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1975).
472. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); United States v. Gargotto, 510 F.2d 409, 411
(6th Cir. 1974). Such constraint is imposed at least following the commencement of an official
arson investigation.
473. Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 26 N.Y.2d 70, 256 N.E.2d 536, 308 N.Y.S.2d 378
(1970). A confession, given to police in violation of the plaintiff-insured's sixth amendment
rights under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), was ruled admissible if voluntarily
made. 26 N.Y.2d at 73, 256 N.E.2d at 537, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
474. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1979]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
compelled to testify at trial, whereas a criminal defendant is often
shielded by the fifth amendment privilege.115 Two important rights
available to insurance companies but not to prosecutors are the
right to request a trial by jury, and a limited right to choose the
forum for the trial.' Certain rules of evidence result in more liberal
admission of evidence in a civil action than will occur in a criminal
case.477 Despite the admissibility of most circumstantial evidence,
the greatest hinderance to a prosecutor is the task of meeting the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. An insurer need only estab-
lish the case by preponderating or "clear and convincing" evi-
dence. 78
The benefits of private litigation to deter arson-fraud are not
exclusively legal in nature. Arson has often been described as falling
into the no man's land between police and fire department responsi-
bility.' 7' Each investigative agency frequently assumes that some
other agency will pursue the time consuming task of compiling evi-
dence for an arson case. The district attorney's office is-frequently
understaffed, and access to the funds necessary to special investiga-
tions is often difficult. Immediate financial resources are usually
available to the insurance company. Although the policy of investi-
gating criminal activity according to the dictates of the profit mo-
tive may be questionable, the insurer would be far more likely to
succeed in its goals, for purely practical, financial, and procedural
475. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
476. See Karp, The Wishbone Offense: A Two-Pronged Attack Against Arson (paper
presented at the A.B.A. Annual Meeting, New York, 1978), p. 11. Regarding choice of forum,
the author gives the example that a non-resident insurance company may elect to remove
the case to federal court, given the criteria for diversity jurisdiction. Id.
477. The insured as plaintiff can be compelled to take the stand. Thereafter, the
"witness's" credibility may be attacked with evidence of prior convictions for felonies. See
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). A criminal defendant in an arson case who has previously been convicted
of arson will probably elect not to take the stand, all other things being equal. The prior
record, therefore, will probably be inadmissable. Similarly, witnesses may be cross-examined
as to other "specific instances of conduct." FED. R. EvID. 608(b). This can include, of course,
prior fires for which insurance payments were received. See Swindle v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
251 So. 2d 787, 791 (La. App. 1971). Such evidence is often used to establish motive or
common plan, e.g., Fifty States Management Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 67 Misc. 2d
778, 787, 324 N.Y.S.2d 345, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1971); cf. Hawks v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.,
93 Idaho 381, 461 P.2d 721 (1969). This rationale for admissibility is also available in the
criminal trial context.
478. See pt IV(C) supra.
479. See, e.g., ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, ARSONS: A REPORT TO THE
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 25-26 (May 1978).
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reasons, than would the government in its prosecution.
There are many reasons why insurance companies should not
form the vanguard of the movement against arson-fraud. The crimi-
nal justice system would certainly suffer if incendiarism became
permissable according to the whims of private companies. Even if
the duty to investigate were forced upon insurers, such regulations
could be evaded in innumerable ways. Distorted settlement ar-
rangements would inevitably result.
The plaintiff bar would quickly assert the "bad faith refusal to
pay insurance proceeds" weapon against insurance companies that
perform law enforcement functions."" Punitive damages are allowed
for an insurer's breach of "an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."'8 This cause of action may not exist in the states
having "penalty statutes,"'82 which, however, achieve essentially
the same result. Protection for insureds is supplemented by the
Model Unfair Claims Practice Settlement Act, which has been en-
acted in more than half of the states."3 There is always the threat,
as well, of an insured's suit for defamation.' If there is a trend in
this area, it is toward greater rights for plaintiff-insureds. Clearly
this trend could not continue simultaneously with an increasingly
strict assertion of the insurer's defenses against an arsonist.
A more abstract argument against investing insurance companies
with the primary duty to deter arson is that the duty is not rightfully
480. For competing views, see Alan G. Miller, Recovery Beyond Property Policy Limits
-A Plaintiff View, 11 THE FORUM 523 (1976); Houser, First Party Claims For More Than
Insurance Policy Limits-A Defendant's Viewpoint, 11 THE FORUM 529 (1976). For an attor-
ney's point of view, see Langdon & Sytama, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and
the Pre-Adjudicatory Role of the Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INS. COUNSELJ. 309 (1978).
481. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 485 (1973). Here the actual "bad faith" was the insurer's alleged attempt to subject the
insured to criminal prosecution. The insurer's claims adjuster gave misinformation to the Los
Angeles Fire Department arson investigator and the insured was charged with arson. Before
the preliminary hearing, the insured failed to submit to an examination under the
"cooperation clause" of the policy. The insurer thereupon denied liability. At the preliminary
hearing, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.
482. Such statutes allow additional recovery (as a percentage of the claim) for a
"vexatious or unreasonable refusal or delay of payment." See Miller, 11 THE FORUM at 527-
28. For an example of such a statute, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963).
483. Houser, 11 THE FORUM at 534-35 n.13 and accompanying text.
484. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 511, 235 A.2d 576 (1967). The defama-
tory statement, of course, can not have been in the judicial setting, or it is privileged. Id. at
515, 235 A.2d at 578.
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theirs. Arson is a crime which, to an even greater degree than most
crimes, threatens the safety and disrupts the security of the popu-
lace. The public at large should be compelled to finance the war on
crime, not the specific victims of each crime. "Arson" can not fairly
be viewed as a cost of owning property to be distributed, by prem-
ium payments, among the community of property owners.5 5 The
threat of arson has become too pervasive to support such a conclu-
sion.
Surely no one would argue that insurers should entirely supplant
the public authorities in the dilemma of arson. A subcommittee of
the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has
recommended the enforcement of certain procedures where a larger
role for fire insurers was found to be in the public interest." 6 Some
of these recommendations are rather innocuous, and are already
substantially being pursued.' Others present serious difficulties.
Insurance industry representatives have responded, stressing the
public interest in low premiums, and current privacy and fair claims
laws.'" The Alliance of American Insurers has already proposed a
485. The insurance industry funded, however, a private arson investigation team, under
the auspices of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, until 1970. This void has since been
partially filled by the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, also supported by the insurance
companies. See NAT'L FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL AD., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ARSON:
AMERICA'S MALIGNANT CRIME 9 (1976).
486. See note 470 supra. The recommendations are as follows:
(1) Insurers should require routine risk reviews prior to coverage, including property
inspection and background checks on applicants.
(2) Insurers should scrutinize current policy on claims challenge, develop effective
arson investigation teams, and make more frequent civil challenges on arson fraud.
(3) Companies should develop in-house investigative expertise and be prepared to
pursue arson investigations.
(4) Insurers should work together with government officials toward modifying privacy
laws and fair claims practice laws.
(5) Companies should require claims adjusters to have better arson investigation train-
ing.
(6) Companies should investigate the possibility of serious corruption in the ranks of
claims adjusters.
(7) Companies should retain and share information on the number, value, and location
of all arsons and suspicious fires, as well as information concerning the owners of such
properties. And
(8) Insurance industry representatives should be afforded an opportunity to testify at
public hearings to present evidence concerning measures being taken to materially
reduce the criminal attractiveness of arson-for-profit.
487. Id. (recommendations (3), (4), and (8)).
488. See Letter of C. Robert Hall, Vice President of the Nat'l Ass'n of Independent
Insurers, entitled "Arson-for-Profit and the Insurance Industry: Villain or Victim?"
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model "Arson Reporting Immunity Bill." ' Variations of this pro-
posal have been passed as legislation in a number of states.4" The
most troublesome requests made of insurance companies are those
involving the most expense, i.e., pre-underwriting investigation,
and thorough use of the common law arson and technical defenses
in civil actions. It is clear that there will be no increased insurance
industry involvement in these areas without the consequential
costs.
Cost, not surprisingly, is a significant obstacle to effective prose-
cution of the crime of arson. One of the most difficult aspects of the
arson prosecution is the proof of the crime itself. Upgrading the
seriousness of the offense may have some minimal deterrent effect.
A more plausible method of curbing the rising arson rate, however,
would be to improve the investigatory potential of the appropriate
law enforcement agencies. The power over the necessary purse
strings rests with the budget officers of the agencies, and, ulti-
mately, with elected public officials.
Anne Winslow Murphy
Andrew Maneval"'
489. *Alliance of American Insurers, Property Loss Research Bureau, Model Legislation,
Arson Reporting Immunity Bill (January 9, 1978).
490. The number of states with such legislation is increasing at a rapid rate. However,
the earlier statutes are as follows: 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 139; 27 GA. CODE ANN. § 92A 734.1
(1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1153 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); ME. Ray. STAT. tit. 25, §
2402 (Supp. 1978); Md. House Bill 370, eff. July 1, 1978; N.Y. INs. LAW § 336 (McKinney
1966); 2C N.C. GEN. STAT. § 69-7.1 (Supp. 1977); OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 3737.16 (Page Supp.
1978); Tax. INs. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 5.46 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Wis. Sen. Bill 377 (1977).
See Taylor Address, supra note 264, at 21 n.3.
491. Pts. I, I, & III prepared by Anne Winslow Murphy; pts. IV & V prepared by Andrew
Maneval.
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